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INTRODUCTION 
The Beginning: To present the first empirical study of substantial simi-
larity litigation in the U.S. circuit courts; and, to set forth preliminary results 
that both contribute to a better understanding of substantial similarity case 
law and open the door for subsequent scholarship to build upon this study. 1 
The End: To provide quantitative support for the common sentiment that the 
current standard for determining copyright infringement must change. This 
study takes the necessary first step; it is the beginning of the end. 
I. All the data included in this study is on file with the author. 
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Each year, over 2,000 copyright infringement cases are filed in the 
U.S. district courts. 2 Yet, the concept of substantial similarity-a "sine qua 
non of every [copyright infringement] determination"-remains one of the 
most elusive in copyright law. 3 Superficially, the concept is simple: "is the 
defendant's work substantially similar to the plaintiffs [work]?"4 However, 
confusion arises from an absence of uniform judicial language, difficulty 
results from the lack of a single substantial similarity test employed 
throughout the circuits, and complexity surfaces when subject matter poles 
apart-from screenplays to computer programs-are adjudicated by the 
same standard. 5 
Since 1930, when Judge Learned Hand famously pronounced in Nich-
ols v. Universal Pictures Co. 6 that the test for infringement of a copyright is 
necessarily vague, courts have recognized that not all works can be com-
pared in exactly the same way. 7 Even so, the desire to fix the boundaries of 
substantial similarity juxtaposed against an understanding that such an at-
tempt would be a failure has persisted over eighty years later. To a great 
extent, this tension is the inevitable product of a doctrine that must vary 
2. U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-COPYRIGHT, PATENT, AND TRADEMARK 
CASES FILED (20 I 0), available at 
http://www. uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudiciaiF actsAndF igures/20 I O/Table407. pdf. 
3. ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW, at xxi (2012); see also CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 692 (6th ed. 
2003) ("The inquiry into improper appropriation, both at trial and on appeal, remains one of 
the most contentious (and, not coincidentally, least precisely delineated) exercises in all of 
copyright law."). 
4. Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward a Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in 
Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 994 (2000) (endorsing the abstrac-
tions framework devised by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Co., em-
bodied in the phrase, "is the defendant's work substantially similar to the plaintiff's?" and 
criticizing subsequent attempts to improve upon that framework). 
5. !d.; see also Ellen M. Bierman, It Walks Like a Duck, Talks Like a Duck, ... But 
Is It a Duck? Making Sense of Substantial Similarity Law as It Applies to User Interfaces, 16 
U. PuGET SOUND L. REv. 319, 321 (I 992) (commenting on the confusion that has been creat-
ed by case law in terms of how to apply the substantial similarity test to different kinds of 
subject matter and stating that the "[a]pplication of these doctrines and principles has not 
always been consistent as copyright law has evolved to embrace new technologies"). 
6. 45 F .2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). Nichols is a seminal case in the development of 
the copyright infringement analysis. See id. In holding that the defendant's play, The Cohens 
and The Kellys, did not infringe upon the copyright of the plaintiff's play, Abie's Irish Rose, 
Judge Learned Hand lays the groundwork for the abstractions test, which involves distin-
guishing unprotectable ideas from protectable expression. See id. at 120, 122. 
7. See, e.g., Christina Bohannon, Taming the Derivative Works Right: A Modest 
Proposal for Reducing Overbreadth and Vagueness in Copyright, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 669,683 (2010) (noting that "the test for infringement of copyright is vague and determi-
nations must be made 'ad hoc"'). 
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according to the circumstances. 8 Yet, it is equally true that there lacks a 
systematic and thorough account of substantial similarity case law that 
would guide how the boundaries of copyright infringement ought to be 
fixed, if at all. 9 As with "fair use," the affirmative defense to copyright in-
fringement, substantial similarity decisions rely on a set of conventionally 
agreed-upon cases. 10 If substantiated improvements are to be made to the 
current framework, a comprehensive study of substantial similarity opinions 
is imperative. Therefore, the results of an empirical study of substantial sim-
ilarity case law in the U.S. circuit courts, set forth below, is the necessary 
first step towards a greater understanding of the substantial similarity doc-
trine. 
Part I reviews the fundamental purposes of copyright law and reveals 
its increasingly vital impact on the modern U.S. economy. It then provides 
an illustration of the problems created by the current state of the substantial 
similarity doctrine. Part II discusses the generalized fashion in which judges 
analyze copyright infringement. It further explains the various substantial 
similarity tests employed throughout the circuits to facilitate an understand-
ing of the differences that exist between them. Part III sets forth the empiri-
cal results of the 234 opinions studied, including an analysis of their distri-
bution along the dimensions of time, venue, substantial similarity test ap-
plied, subject matter of the copyrightable works at issue, and procedural 
posture. Along each of the dimensions, Part III also reports the substantial 
similarity win rates 11 in the case law. Finally, Part III reports the reversal 
and affirmance rates of the opinions studied. Significantly, interwoven 
throughout Part III is a thoughtful examination of the findings that seeks to 
identify the driving forces and their implications on the future of the sub-
stantial similarity case law. 
8. See, e.g., Thomas M. Cunningham, Extending Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial 
Similarity and the Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of Non-Literary Subject Matter, 
55 U. Pn-r. L. REV. 239, 262-63 (1993) (advocating a material-specific approach to determin-
ing substantial similarity); Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for 
Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1361-62 (2009) (proposing a 
framework for tailoring intellectual property rights that helps answer pending policy ques-
tions, such as "whether ... statutory licenses should be granted for certain types of copy-
righted works ... and whether fashion design should receive sui generis protection"). 
9. See, e.g., Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121 ("Nobody has ever been able to fix that bound-
ary, and nobody ever can."). 
I 0. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 552-53 (2008) (analogizing the '"great men"' approach to 
history with the '"leading cases'" approach to fair use, whereby wisdom about fair use case 
law draws from a limited set of"hand-picked" opinions). 
II. "Win rates" refers to the proportion of opinions that found copyright infringe-
ment on the basis of substantial similarity and thus held in favor of the copyright holder. 
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I. THE PURPOSE AND THE PROBLEM 
Copyright litigation has increased dramatically in the past twenty 
years, from the number of lawsuits filed to the cost of prosecuting, defend-
ing, and resolving a claim. 12 With the average cost of a copyright case rang-
ing between $384,000 and $2 million 13 and the normalcy of multimillion-
dollar verdicts, 14 it is not surprising that the outcome of litigation has pro-
found repercussions. For the litigants involved, often the survival of the 
business and the livelihood of the individual are at stake. 15 Thus, while it is 
commonplace to assert that the law should change, the bigger picture-the 
purpose of copyright law and its impact on the economy-must not be taken 
for granted. 16 
A. The Fundamental Purpose and Modem Importance of Copyright Law 
Though the seeds of copyright Jaw were planted long before the pas-
sage of the first federal Copyright Act in 1790, 17 its roots are most famously 
recognized in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, 18 which 
states the purpose of copyrights: "To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 19 The delicate 
balancing of public interests with individual rights embodied within the 
Copyright Clause means that within the free market system, the creator 
should be able to earn a living, but not to such an extent that it stifles pro-
gress or inhibits creativity. 20 
12. TOD J. ZUCKERMAN, ROBERT D. CHESLER & CHRISTOPHER KEEGAN, ASSETS & 
FINANCE: INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & CYBER CLAIMS § I :6 
(2011 ). 
13. American Intellectual Property Law Association Report of the Economic Survey, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSURANCE SERVICES CORPORATION, 
http://www.patentinsurance.com/iprisk!aipla-survey/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). 
14. ZUCKERMAN, CHESLER & KEEGAN, supra note 12, § I :6. 
15. !d. 
16. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. 
17. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A BRIEF INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circla.html; cf Matt Jackson, One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back: An Historical Analysis of Copyright Liability, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 367, 370 
(2002) (examining the "legislative histories of the 1909 and 1976 copyright acts"). 
18. L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the 
Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909,910 (2003). 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 8. 
20. Patterson & Joyce, supra note 18, at 951-52 ("The entrepreneur must be able to 
earn a profit in order to produce the materials of learning, but not to the extent that the profit 
unduly inhibits the citizen's use of the product."); see also Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. 
Co., 720 F.2d 231, 245 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that substantial similarity is used to "strike a 
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This balancing act has become increasingly relevant as intellectual 
property now pervades most U.S. industries. 21 Creative ideas have an enor-
mous value in the modern American economy: industry analysts estimate 
that, as of 2011, intellectual capitaF2 is worth between $8.1 trillion and $9.2 
trillion, the equivalent of 55% to 62.5% of the U.S. gross domestic product 
in 2010. 23 "Core" copyright-related industries24 and design-oriented indus-
tries25 alone were worth $1.52 trillion in 2007. 26 In fact, from 2004 to 2007, 
copyright industries consistently achieved growth rates of "more than twice 
the real growth rates achieved by the U.S. economy as a whole."27 The con-
tribution of copyright industries to the growth of the United States is unde-
niably substantial. 28 Thus, the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights are critical to the advancement of new ideas; without it, in-
novators would have little incentive to develop intellectual property. 29 In-
delicate balance between the protection to which authors are entitled under an act of Con-
gress and the freedom that exists for all others to create their works outside the area protected 
against infringement"). 
21. KEVIN A. HASSETI & ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, WHAT IDEAS ARE WORTH: THE VALUE 
OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IV-V 
(20 II), available at 
http://www.sonecon.com/docs/studiesNalue_of_lntellectual_Capital_in_American_Econom 
y.pdf. 
22. Intellectual capital is strictly defined as "patents, copyrights, and the research 
and development that produces them." /d. at I. 
23. /d. at 2. Based on the notion that the United States has become an idea-based 
economy that can be measured in very concrete terms, Hassett and Shapiro conducted a 
study to estimate the monetary value of intellectual capital. /d. at IV. Much of the data comes 
from the Federal Reserve, "which show that since the mid-I990s, a majority of U.S. business 
investments have gone into intangible assets rather than traditional physical assets." /d. 
24. /d. at I2 ('"[C]ore' copyright industries-music, publishing, broadcasting, mo-
tion pictures, and software-generated 6.4 percent of U.S. GDP in 2007 ($889.I billion 
dollars)."). 
25. /d. "[D]esign-oriented industries ... [include] jewelry and video games, [as well 
as] support industries, such as telecom services, and the manufacturers and retailers of CDs, 
DVD players, and computers." /d. 
26. /d.; see also STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE 2003-
2007 REPORT 3 (2009), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IIPASiwekReport2003-07.pdf 
(reporting data that "quantify the size and critical importance of the copyright industries to 
the U.S. economy"). 
27. SIWEK, supra note 26, at I7. The copyright industries have disproportionately 
contributed to real U.S. growth in a very positive way. /d. "In 2006-2007, the core copyright 
industries contributed 22.74% of the real growth achieved for the U.S. economy as a whole . 
. . [while] the total copyright industries contributed an astounding 43.06% of total real U.S. 
growth." /d. 
28. See id. 
29. HASSETI & SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at V; see also Lisa M. Gable, The Feasibil-
ity of the Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test for Computer Software Copyrightability 
(and Analysis of Bateman v. Mnemonics), I4 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 447, 487 (I998) ("If com-
petitors may copy programs with impunity, incentives to create and market innovative pro-
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deed, "$200 billion in counterfeit or pirated goods were traded across bor-
ders in 2005," "$12.5 billion in pirated music was sold in 2007," "$51 bil-
lion in pirated software was sold in 2009," and between "$70 billion [and] 
$88 billion in counterfeit pharmaceuticals [were] sold in 2011."30 No longer 
is the strict protection of intellectual property rights simply to benefit the 
creator; it is essential to the productivity, growth, and income in the idea-
based economy of the United States, especially in the idea-intensive indus-
tries. 31 
In light of the current state of copyright law--characterized by confu-
sion, inconsistency, and the "indeterminacy and misapplication of tests for 
copyright infringement"-these figures are alarming. 32 Problematically, 
substantial similarity decisions rely on a relatively small set of convention-
ally agreed-upon cases that often fail to account for the intricacies of the 
fact-specific issues inherent in the highly subjective substantial similarity 
analysis. 33 Sole dependence on an anecdotal method of using "hand-picked" 
opinions appearing in the U.S. Reports or student casebooks to analyze in-
fringement disputes is a flawed endeavor. 34 It unclear whether these opin-
ions are representative of the substantial similarity doctrine as it is practiced 
in courts today; but, more importantly, such a method risks having far-flung 
and adverse effects on intellectual property rights and on the U.S. economy. 
A comprehensive empirical study of substantial similarity opinions is neces-
sary to mediate such risks and to determine the true merits and consequenc-
es of the current approaches; it provides the concrete support that is neces-
sary to advocate or oppose a change in a law that has taken decades to 
evolve into what it is today. 
B. An Illustration of the Problem 
At the heart of this study is the desire to determine whether or not "our 
[bizarre system] for proving copyright infringement"35 is deserving of as 
much criticism as it receives. Surely, with recent cases like Davis v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Cos.,36 it is easy to see why such scholarly disparagement 
grams will decrease, thereby frustrating the goal of copyright law, which is to promote crea-
tive authorship for the public benefit."). 
30. HASSETT & SHAPIRO, supra note 21, at VI. 
31. /d. 
32. Mohler, supra note 4, at 972. 
33. Beebe, supra note 10, at 554 (arguing that "much of our conventional wisdom 
about our fair use case law, deduced as it has been from the leading cases, is wrong"). 
34. !d. at 553. 
35. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 1. 
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 719, 719-20, 741 (2010) (arguing that the majority approaches to 
substantial similarity defined by Ninth and Second Circuits make no sense in application). 
36. No. I :10-CV-167, 2010 WL 2998476, at *I (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2010). 
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exists. In that case, the Western District of Michigan dismissed the plain-
tiff's allegations that the defendant's television series, Eli Stone, about a 
lawyer who has auditory hallucinations that are accompanied by popular 
rock songs, was substantially similar to the plaintiff's novels about a spy 
hero named Ely Stone, an American Indian who also has auditory hallucina-
tions accompanied by popular rock songs. 37 Curiously, both protagonists are 
"reluctant heroes," who use their visions to help people through the guid-
ance and interpretation of their spiritual advisors. 38 
Still, further "coincidences" abound. 39 To list a few: both works in-
volve love triangles with a woman named "Maggie"; predicaments in which 
each protagonist helps a sick child; visions of being in an historical war; 
side characters named "Stanley" who flee to Hawaii for personal financial 
gain; pilots named "Ramirez"; similarly named characters-"Patti" and 
"Nettie"-with secretarial-type roles; and antagonists with the same initials, 
albeit reversed, "Matt Dowd" and "Deputy Morse."40 Despite such obvious 
similarities, the judge in the case noted,41 "[r]easonable minds could not 
differ on this issue," as apparently, the works share "no overlap" of original 
elements, and the similarities between them are "either unprotectible [sic] or 
not substantial."42 The defendant thus prevailed on summary judgment.43 
However, reasonable minds can, and often do, differ. A leading enter-
tainment litigator believes that "[ c ]opyright infringement claims against 
motion picture studios and television networks, for all intents and purposes, 
are dead."44 In the last twenty years, all forty-eight copyright infringement 
lawsuits against motion picture studios and television networks within the 
Second and Ninth Circuits and their district courts resulted in defendant 
37. ld. at *1-3. 
38. ld. at *8. 
39. "Judge Jonker agreed that the works do have some coincidental elements: side 
characters named Stanley who both have a connection to Hawaii, a love interest named 
Maggie, spiritual advisers and a love triangle." Michigan Federal Judge Finds No Similari-
ties Between TV Show, Mystery Books, WESTLAW J. ENT. INDUS., Sept. 8, 2010, at 5, 5. 
40. Davis, 2010 WL 2998476, at *8-10; Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 6-7, 
9, Davis, (No. 1 :10-CV-167) 2010 WL 3266364. 
41. On judges' roles in fact-finding on substantial similarity claims, see Timothy L. 
Warnock, Where'd You Get That Idea?: Stay Current with These Updates to Copyright Law, 
46 TENN. B.J. 12, 13 (June 2010) ("Although substantial similarity is typically a fact-
intensive inquiry, courts were increasingly willing to determine that no rational fact finder 
could determine the result any differently than the court, and courts consequently resolved 
substantial-similarity challenges on motions to dismiss and summary judgment."). 
42. Davis, 2010 WL 2998476, at *10 ("The books and the show are completely 
different in almost every imaginable way, including the sequences of events, mood, dialogue, 
characters, plot, pace, setting, and themes .... Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' 
motion to dismiss."). 
43. Jd. 
44. Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, 33 L.A. LAW. 32, 32 (2010). 
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victories. 45 Only two of the forty-eight cases proceeded to jury trial, while 
the remaining cases were decided on motions for summary judgment. 46 Da-
vis, then, is simply a corpse in the death of copyright law, at least in terms 
of literary works, as "[ c ]ase law has provided defendants with an impene-
trable shield of confusing and often contradictory principles that thwart 
plaintiffs in nearly every instance, with only tiny cracks in that shield 
providing a mere glimpse of hope."47 But, studios and television networks 
are not the only defendants who can exploit the clouded tests for substantial 
similarity and the "morass of confusing case law."48 The Copyright Defend-
ant's Guide to Disproving Substantial Similarity on Summary Judgment, 49 
authored by two intellectual property litigators, offers a "replicable, flexible, 
and legally defensible" step-by-step method that "if recent decisions are any 
indication, should bolster a defendant's chances of success at the summary 
judgment stage on the issue of substantial similarity" for all copyrightable 
works. 5° 
Insight from those in the trenches paints a compelling picture of the 
defendant-favored state of substantial similarity case law, 51 but practicing 
attorneys are not its only critics. 52 Stating that the "overwhelming percent-
age" of lawsuits against Hollywood movies fail, 53 one scholar argues for a 
lowering of the current substantial similarity standard as it is applied to 
screenplays. 54 Arguably, this would level the playing field between studios 
and "vulnerable" screenwriters facing the "difficult challenge" of proving 
that his or her script has been stolen. 55 It seems that the task of proving cop-
yright infringement of a creative work "may be even more difficult than 
45. !d. 
46. !d. 
47. !d. at 40. 
48. Joshua M. Dalton & Sara Cable, The Copyright Defendant's Guide to Disprov-
ing Substantial Similarity on Summary Judgment, 3 LANDSLIDE 26, 31 (20 II) ("Given their 
increasingly busy dockets, it seems safe to assume that a federal court would be especially 
amenable to an approach that efficiently guides it ... towards a legally supported and logical 
method by which it can discern and dismiss legally insufficient copyright infringement 
claims."). 
49. !d. at 29-31 (charting an approach that a copyright defendant in any circuit can 
take to increase the chance of defeating substantial similarity on summary judgment). 
50. !d. at 31. The article also lists common constituent elements of literary works, 
musical works, architectural works, computer programs, and photographic works that the 
defendant should argue are commonplace in each of the genres. !d. at 28. 
51. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text. 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
53. Nick Gladden, When California Dreamin' Becomes a Hollywood Nightmare; 
Copyright Infringement and the Motion Picture Screenplay: Toward an Improved Frame-
work, I 0 J. lNTELL. PROP. L. 359, 360 (2003). 
54. !d. at 360-61. 
55. !d. 
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creating the work in the first place."56 With vague substantial similarity 
tests, their incorrect application, and inconsistent results to blame, it is ra-
tional to proffer that there should not be a test at all. 57 
In light of such fervent criticism and concern that case law is sharply 
skewed in favor of the defendants, it is rational to wonder whether or not the 
concept of substantial similarity even possesses the substance "to make the 
value judgment whether [a] defendant's copying warrants liability."58 
II. THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT DETERMINATION: ESTABLISHING THE 
ELEMENTS AND APPLYING A SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY TEST 
Although this study focuses on the substantial similarity tests, it is im-
portant to note that the substantial similarity evaluation is but one element 
of copyright infringement. 59 While it is a critical element, not all actions for 
copyright infringement ever reach this step of the analysis.6° Certainly, the 
difficulty of comparing the various substantial similarity tests is compound-
ed by the fact that the circuits vary in their step-by-step approaches to the 
elements of copyright infringement. 61 In other words, not only are the sub-
56. See, e.g., Nicole K. Roodhuyzen, Do We Even Need a Test? A Reevaluation of 
Assessing Substantial Similarity in a Copyright Infringement Case, 15 J.L. & PoL'Y 1375, 
1375, 1418-19 (2007) (arguing that the current tests do not adequately consider the degree of 
creativity inherent in various industries). 
57. !d. at 1377 ("As the tests become increasingly elusive for both courts and liti-
gants, it is important to consider whether there should be one single test articulated by the 
Supreme Court, or rather, whether there should be a test at all."); see also Amy B. Cohen, 
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 719, 719 (1987) (criticizing "the traditional approach as failing adequately to 
distinguish copying from misappropriation, failing adequately to distinguish ideas from 
expression, failing to provide adequate guidelines for determining misappropriation"). 
58. Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity 
Down to Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 185 (1994). "[S]ubstantial similarity and resulting 
infringement are found without reference to any standard to give substantial similarity mean-
ing and without regard to the impact of the defendant's activities on the plaintiff." /d. at 182. 
59. Gladden, supra note 53, at 460. 
60. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: 1.1. 
61. Douglas Y'Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright 
Infringement, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 285, 285-86 (1999) (demonstrating that the Second-Ninth 
Circuit distinction is substantial, but ignored by the other circuits, which apply the two tests 
interchangeably); see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.l[A] ("It is the 
different interpretations of Arnstein that are the root of the differences between the Ninth 
Circuit test and the Second Circuit test."). While the Second Circuit requires the plaintiff to 
prove both copying and illicit copying (unlawful appropriation) to establish infringement, the 
Ninth Circuit takes the position that Arnstein was actually alluding to the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and thus, '"[t]o constitute an infringement the copying must reach the point of 
unlawful appropriation or the copying of protected expression itself."' !d. § 3:1 n.l (quoting 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1165 (9th 
Cir. 1977)). 
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stantial similarity tests muddled, the paths leading to them are also diver-
gent. 62 Thus, to supplement the following analysis, it is helpful to under-
stand the basic analysis used in copyright infringement cases. 63 
A. An Overview of the Prima Facie Case of Copyright Infringement 
In any action for copyright infringement, the plaintiff must clear two 
hurdles, the first of which is simple: he or she must show ownership of a 
valid, registered copyright to the allegedly infringed work. 64 To clear the 
second hurdle, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant copied original 
elements from the copyrighted work. 65 The second hurdle involves two 
main parts: (1) proving, through direct or indirect evidence, that the defend-
ant's allegedly infringing work was copied from the plaintiffs protected 
work, rather than created independently; and (2) establishing that the de-
fendant copied protected "expression," as opposed to unprotectable "ide-
as."66 The final proof, known as the idea/expression dichotomy, is the axiom 
at the heart of copyright law: "only the expression of ideas, and not the ide-
as themselves, are copyrightable."67 
Copying can be proven through direct or indirect evidence, but be-
cause eyewitness testimony or an admission by the defendant is unlikely, 
this element is often met through indirect proof from which the fact finder 
could properly infer that copying had occurred. 68 Such circumstantial evi-
dence requires both access and "probative similarity," or-in the absence of 
access-"striking similarity."69 To show that the infringing work is "proba-
tively similar" to the plaintiffs work, there must be sufficient similarity 
between the two works to support an inference of copying, 70 and it merely 
requires that the defendant copied "something from the copyrighted 
work."71 Alternatively, even without proof of access, copying can be estab-
lished by showing "striking similarity"-that "the similarities [between the 
62. See Y'Barbo, supra note 61, at 285-86. 
63. See id. 
64. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § I: I; see also 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, 
THE LAw OF CoPYRIGHT§ 14:6 (20 II) (providing an outline of the proofs needed to establish 
a prima facie case of infringement primarily based on the traditional approach of the Second 
Circuit). 
65. See 2 ABRAMS, supra note 64, § 14:6. 
66. !d. 
67. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 2.02 (2012). 
68. ALAN LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND 
THE 1976 ACT 161 (5th ed. 1979). 
69. !d.; see also Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward 
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1189 (1990). 
70. See David Nimmer, Access Denied, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 769, 784. 
71. Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70,75 (2d Cir. 1997) (em-
phasis added). 
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two works] must be so striking as to preclude the possibility that plaintiff 
and defendant" created the work independently. 72 In such a case, the court 
considers "the uniqueness of the similarities,"73 including similarities that 
are quirky or appear in unique or complex contexts, and common mistakes 
or idiosyncrasies that can only be explained by copying. 74 
Once copying has been proven through direct or indirect evidence, 75 
the final part of the second hurdle requires the plaintiff to establish that the 
defendant copied enough protected expression from the plaintiffs work to 
render both the original and the alleged copy substantially similar. 76 Sub-
stantial similarity, a seemingly simplistic term of art, masks its own com-
plexity.77 To support a finding of infringement on the basis of substantial 
similarity, the copying must be quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient. 78 
A perception that two works are merely "similar" is not sufficient, 79 but 
verbatim or literal copying of an entire work is also not required. 80 Yet, in 
some cases, copying of a relatively small portion of a work can be actiona-
ble if that portion is material and substantial. 81 There are no mechanical 
72. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464,468 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Repp v. Webber, 
132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997); Towler v. Sayles. 76 F.3d 579, 584-85 (4th Cir. 1996); 
Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright Law: Infringement of Musical Works and the Appropriateness of 
Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c), 39 U. MEM. L. 
REv. 1037, 1046 (2009). 
73. OsTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 1 :3 ("For example, for two pieces of 
popular music to be 'strikingly similar' the similarities must extend 'beyond themes that 
could have been derived from a common source or themes that are so trite as to be likely to 
reappear in many compositions."' (quoting Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d 
Cir. 1988))). 
74. See Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1170-71 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464,471-72 (2d Cir. 1995). 
75. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § I :3 ("A plaintiff who demonstrates 
that a defendant's work is 'strikingly similar' to his copyrighted work still must show that the 
copied portions comprise a significant enough portion of the copyrighted material in plain-
tiff's work so that the defendant's work is 'substantially similar' to the copyrighted work." 
(citing Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896,901 (7th Cir. 1984))). 
76. !d. at§ 1: I. 
77. ld. 
78. Ringgold v. Black Entrn't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997); see 
also 2 ABRAMS, supra note 64, § 14:6. Different terms have been used to refer to infringe-
ment or actionable copying. 2 ABRAMS, supra note 64, § 14:6 n.l3. "For example, in ... 
[Arnstein], Judge Frank used the terms 'copying which is not illicit,' 'unlawfully appropriat-
ed,' and 'wrongfully appropriated' all in a single paragraph to describe the copying of the 
portions of a work protected by copyright." /d. (quoting Arnstein, 154 F.2d 464,468,473 (2d 
Cir. 1946)). 
79. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,912 (2d Cir. 1980). 
80. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354,360 (9th Cir. 1947) 
(citing KARL OAKES, COPYRIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 18 C.J.S. COPYRIGHTS § 
66). 
81. Miller Brewing Co. v. Carling O'Keefe Breweries of Can., Ltd., 452 F. Supp. 
429, 439 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). 
The Beginning of the End 525 
guidelines, no hard and fast rules, and no percentages that can be applied to 
determine what constitutes a substantial, and thus infringing, similarity, and 
it is impossible to decide how much taking is too much without referring to 
the specific works in question. 82 Not surprisingly then, in an effort to guide 
the determination of whether the copying is quantitatively and qualitatively 
sufficient to warrant a finding of substantial similarity,83 courts have formu-
lated several tests: the ordinary observer test, 84 the more discerning ordinary 
observer test, 85 the extrinsic/intrinsic test, 86 the total concept and feel test, 87 
and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. 88 In general, the goal of the 
substantial similarity tests is the same; but, in practice, each are applied 
differently in different circuits with different outcomes. 89 
B. The Various Tests in the Various Circuits 
Modern substantial similarity case law has been shaped, in large part, 
by the two major copyright courts: 90 the Second Circuit, which encompasses 
New York City-the world's Mecca of art, entertainment, publishing, and 
fashion 91-and the Ninth Circuit, home to both Silicon Valley and Holly-
wood. 92 Consequently, this study's discussion of modern U.S. substantial 
similarity case law is largely a discussion of the 122 opinions produced by 
the Second and Ninth Circuits, and the "progeny of these opinions in the 
82. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § I: I. 
83. !d. 
84. See, e.g., Lapine v. Seinfeld, No. 08Civ.l28(LTS)(RLE), 2009 WL 2902584, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (applying the ordinary observer test). 
85. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: !.!. 
86. See, e.g., Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 
1204 (D. Haw. 2006) (applying the extrinsic/intrinsic test). 
87. !d. at 1208-09; Daniel Su, Note, Substantial Similarity and Architectural Works: 
Filtering Out "Total Concept and Feel," 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1851, 1870-72 (2007). The total 
concept and feel test is part of the intrinsic test. 
88. Computer Assocs. lnt'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(creating the abstraction-filtration-comparison test). 
89. See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
90. Douglas Y'Barbo, On the Legal Standard for Copyright lrifringement, !999 
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 3, 3 ("[T]he legal standard relied upon to determine copyright infringe-
ment is deeply fissured between the two major copyright courts-the Second and Ninth 
Circuits."). 
91. See Nicole Giambarrese, The Look for Less: A Survey of Intellectual Property 
Protections in the Fashion Industry, 26 TouRo L. REV. 243, 243, 245 (201 0) (discussing 
New York City's cultural status as an impetus for Second Circuit protections). 
92. See William K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. I, 41 (2006) ("Overall, the Second Circuit is the clear leader in terms of experience and 
influence .... [T]he Second Circuit consistently published at least 31.3% of the copyright 
opinions from the 1890s through the 1970s, more than any other circuit by wide margins .... 
The Ninth Circuit overtook the Second Circuit in the 1980s, publishing a little over 25% of 
the opinions."). 
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other federal courts."93 The First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits apply the ordinary observer test,94 which originated in the Second Cir-
cuit in Arnstein v. Porter. 95 The abstraction-filtration test96 used in the Sixth 
and Tenth circuits originated from Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., also 
in the Second Circuit. 97 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits follow the Ninth 
Circuit's two-part, extrinsic/intrinsic substantial similarity test delineated in 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 98 
Still, despite having stemmed from landmark decisions of just two circuits, 
there are significant differences even within the major schools of thought.99 
The result is twelve federal circuit courts each with a unique approach to 
conducting the substantial similarity analysis. 100 
1. The Ordinary Observer Test 
The ordinary observer test, championed by the Second Circuit, has 
been adopted by the First, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. 101 In deciding 
Arnstein, a dispute involving musical compositions, 102 the Second Circuit 
held it would be inappropriate to determine infringement by comparing the 
songs "as they appear on paper" or by using the "judgment of trained musi-
cians."103 Instead, because the musician's "legally protected interest is ... 
his interest in the potential financial returns from his compositions," the 
substantial similarity determination should be made by the audience for 
whom the music is composed-the "lay listeners." 104 Hence, the ordinary 
observer test attempts to compare the two works from the perspective of a 
hypothetical, average lay observer. 105 
93. Beebe, supra note I 0, at 568. In his empirical study of fair use opinions, Profes-
sor Beebe also found that the "opinions from courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits exerted 
a great deal of influence-much more than is generally thought-on fair use opinions outside 
of those circuits." !d. at 567; see also OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3 ("Most 
courts use one of two tests: the copying/unlawful appropriation test associated with the Sec-
ond Circuit or the extrinsic/intrinsic test associated with the Ninth Circuit."). 
94. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: I. 
95. 154 F.2d 464, 468, 4 72-73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
96. 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT§ 9:94 (2012). 
97. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
98. 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 
3:2. 
99. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3. 
100. See infra Subsections II.B.1-3. 
I 01. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: I. 
102. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1946). 
103. !d. at473. 
104. !d. 
105. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.1 [A] ("The ordinary observer test 
is no more than an attempt to gauge the reaction of the ordinary 'man on the street' to the 
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The Second Circuit developed a refined version of the ordinary ob-
server test, the "more discerning" ordinary observer test, to address works 
that contain a substantial portion of unprotectable public domain material, in 
addition to protectable elements. 106 The more discerning ordinary observer 
test requires the fact finder to remove the unprotectable elements from con-
sideration and determine, on the basis of the protectable elements that re-
main, whether the overall look and feel of the works are substantially simi-
lar. 107 This fact finder must compare the works from the perspective of the 
same hypothetical ordinary observer, but the observer must distinguish pro-
tectable expression from unprotectable public domain material. 108 Discern-
ing protectable and unprotectable material is essential to the analysis; unless 
public domain elements are excluded from consideration, the fact finder will 
find similarities between elements that neither party "owns," which could 
discourage the creation of derivative works based on public domain materi-
als.lo9 
The First Circuit follows the Second Circuit's step-by-step process, 110 
but it also frequently cites Ninth Circuit cases, as if unaware of the fissure 
between the two legal standards. 111 Like the Second Circuit, the First Circuit 
generally excludes expert testimony in its application of the ordinary ob-
server test. 112 Unlike the Second Circuit, the First Circuit does not expressly 
apply the more discerning ordinary observer test to cases involving both 
protectable and unprotectable elements. 113 However, it does mandate that 
"only similarities between protected expression" are to be evaluated. 114 Fur-
ther, the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits evaluate infringement on a slid-
two works .... The fact finder decides whether an average lay observer would recognize the 
alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."). 
106. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262,265,268-69,272-73 (2d Cir. 2001) (con-
sidering elements of copyrighted quilt taken from public domain); Tufenkian Import/Export 
Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 129-30, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2003) (con-
sidering elements of carpets taken from public domain and finding infringement). 
I 07. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.1 [B]. 
108. !d. 
109. See Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 764-66 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(directing the trier of fact to factor out the unprotectable elements and to consider only the 
protectable elements); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1003 (2d Cir. I 995) 
(noting that if one "dissected" works of visual art too far the result would be a finding that 
says "'there can be no originality in a painting because all colors of paint have been used 
somewhere in the past."' (quoting Transcript of Record at 4, Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, 
Ltd., (1992) (No. 92 Civ. 6285 (JSM)), 1994 WL 25661 1)). 





528 Michigan State Law Review 2013:513 
ing scale. 115 On one end of the scale, when an idea can only be expressed in 
one way, "merger bars any claim of infringement." 116 Moving down the 
scale, "[ w ]hen the idea and its expression are not completely inseparable, 
there may still be only a limited number of ways of expressing the idea," in 
which case the plaintiff carries the burden of showing "near identity" be-
tween the works at issue. 117 At the opposite end of the scale, the plaintiff is 
granted broad protection for works that embody only one of infinite ways of 
expressing an idea. 118 
The Third Circuit likewise analyzes substantial similarity as the Sec-
ond Circuit does, despite its inconsistent semantics. 119 Uniquely, cases in the 
Third Circuit tend to involve factual works, 120 and-regardless of the sub-
ject matter--courts evaluate substantial similarity via a side-by-side com-
parison of the works, examining them as they would appear to an ordinary 
observer. 121 The Third Circuit is perhaps most well-known for its unique 
approach to analyzing computer programs, created in Whelan Associates, 
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc. 122 
The Fifth Circuit has adopted both the Second Circuit's ordinary ob-
server test and the more discerning ordinary observer test. 123 However, in 
the Fifth Circuit, if the plaintiff fails to "produce the works for a side-by-
side comparison, he cannot prevail." 124 Such a requirement is mandated in 
only two other circuits, the Seventh and the Eleventh, 125 and has been criti-
cized for its potential to exterminate meritorious claims. 126 
115. !d.; Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 290 (3d Cir. 
1991); Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975) (stating 
"[i]f the quantum of originality" in plaintiff's work is very modest, more substantial similari-
ty is required for there to be infringement (citing Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman 
Co., 268 F. Supp. 711,713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))). 
116. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: 1.3. 
117. !d. (quoting Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 
606 (I st Cir. 1988)). 
118. /d. 
119. !d. The term "substantial similarity" has two meanings in the Third Circuit. 3 
PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:165. "[S]ubstantial similarity to show that the original work has 
been copied is not the same as substantial similarity to prove infringement" (unlawful appro-
priation)." !d. § 9:166. 
120. 3PATRY,supranote96,§9:165. 
121. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: 1.3. 
122. 797 F.2d 1222, 1224 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:165 
("Whelan Associates Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory set off an avalanche of litigation, 
which was subsequently stopped cold by the Second Circuit's forceful rejection of Whelan in 
its 1992 Computer Associates lnt 'I v. Altai, Inc. opinion .... "). 
123. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.4; 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 
9:186. 
124. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3: 1.4. 
125. !d. 
126. Roodhuyzen, supra note 56, at 1396 ("As evidenced in Gen. Universal Sys., the 
side-by-side approach articulated by the Fifth Circuit has the potential to throw out of court 
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The Seventh Circuit, said to be "a flagship court of appeals in copy-
right jurisprudence" due to its "well-thought out" opinions, 127 adheres to a 
hybrid approach between the Second and the Fifth Circuits. 128 The Seventh 
Circuit uses the ordinary observer test, and though it does not expressly 
apply the more discerning ordinary observer test to disputes involving both 
protectable and unprotectable elements, its actual analysis does not differ 
significantly from the Second Circuit. 129 Different from the other circuit 
courts that follow the ordinary observer test, the Seventh Circuit considers 
dissimilarities in addition to the overall similarities, reasoning that "numer-
ous differences tend to undercut the likelihood of substantial similarity and 
are thus relevant considerations.'' 130 The Seventh Circuit is distinctive in 
holding that copyrighted works have a "trademark-law-type range of protec-
tion." The Seventh Circuit considers a plaintiffs work "weak and protected 
only from identical copying or very close paraphrasing" if the idea and ex-
pression are indistinguishable, but considers the work stronger and worthy 
of broader protection as it embodies more "particularized expression." 131 
2. The Extrinsic/Intrinsic Test 
The extrinsic/intrinsic test emerged as the 1977 brainchild of the Ninth 
Circuit in Sid & Marty Krafft Television Productions, Inc. 132 and has been 
adopted by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits. 133 In affirming the infringement 
of the children's television show, H.R. Pufnstuf, by McDonald's McDon-
ald/and, the court created a bifurcated test. 134 First, the fact finder conducts 
an "extrinsic" comparison of the works' similarities between ideas; and 
second, the fact finder makes an "intrinsic," purely subjective, assessment 
of whether the "total concept and feel" of the two works are substantially 
similar from the perspective of a hypothetical ordinary and reasonable per-
son. 135 The "extrinsic test" requires the court to determine, with the assis-
possibly meritorious claims on the basis that the party cannot provide the alleged infringing 
work to do a side-by-side comparison."). 
127. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:210 (referencing two Seventh Circuit opinions, 
Selle v. Gibb and Aurora World, Inc. v. Ty Inc. that are a "textbook of their own on infringe-
ment and fair use"). 
128. OSTERBERG &OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.5. 
129. /d. 
130. Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Ill. 1984); see also Scott v. 
WKJG, Inc., 3 76 F.2d 467, 469 (7th Cir. 1967). 
131. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.5 ("The other circuits that have 
sanctioned this trademark-law-type range of protection are the First and Third Circuits."). 
132. Sid & MartyKrofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 
1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
133. OSTERBERG &OSTERBERG, supra note 3, §§ 3:2.2 to .3. 
134. /d.§ 3.2.1[A]. 
135. /d.; see also Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984). 
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tance of expert testimony, whether the ideas are substantially similar by 
objectively dissecting, listing, and comparing the ideas used in each work. 136 
The "intrinsic test" compares the overall expression of the two works, ex-
cluding expert testimony and dissection. 137 In Shaw v. Lindheim, "after 13 
years of bad experiences with Kro.fft," the Ninth Circuit modified the extrin-
sic/intrinsic test. 138 The Court explained that the extrinsic test does not com-
pare the works' ideas themselves, rather it determines whether there is any 
similarity in the expression of those elements. 139 The Court clarified the 
intrinsic test as the "visceral reaction" of an ordinary observer "virtually 
devoid of analysis." 140 Thus, unlike other formulations of the infringement 
test, the Ninth Circuit analyzes ideas and expression in the first step, but 
only expression in the second step. 141 While the intrinsic test apparently 
compares the works "as a whole," the unprotectable elements are not in-
cluded in the analysis-a conflict with the ordinary observer test, which 
simply compares the works from the perspective of an ordinary observer. 142 
Though the extrinsic/intrinsic test has been criticized as infinitely 
complicated143 and "often difficult to apply," 144 the Fourth Circuit has ad-
hered to the test as it is explained in Litchfield v. Spielberg. 145 Under the 
Fourth Circuit's extrinsic test, the plaintiff must show that the works "con-
tain substantially similar ideas that are subject to copyright protection," and 
the test requires the court to list and compare the elements of the works. 146 
Once extrinsic similarity has been established, the Fourth Circuit, like the 
Ninth, tests intrinsic similarity by comparing the "total concept and feel" of 
the works. 147 Significantly, however, the Fourth Circuit's intrinsic test eval-
uates substantial similarity from the perspective of the intended audience of 
the works, which is not necessarily the ordinary observer. 148 The "intended 
136. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.l[A] ("For works of visual art ... 
'[s]uch criteria include the type of artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter 
and the setting for the subject."' (quoting Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164)); see also Aurora World, 
Inc. v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2009). ' 
137. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.l[A]. 
138. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:235. 
139. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.1 [B]. 
140. Id. 
141. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:235. 
142. Id. Professor Patry questions how the works can be compared as a whole when 
all of the unprotectable elements have been filtered out. Id. 
143. !d. (stating that even though both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit use a 
two-step analysis, the two tests bear no resemblance to each other). 
144. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.l[H] ("The application of the 
extrinsic test ... is a somewhat unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent."). 
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audience" test, as it is called, is reserved for cases in which the intended 
audience possesses "specialized expertise" that the average observer 
lacks. 149 At present, the intended audience test has only been applied in de-
cisions involving children's works 150 and computer programs. 151 
The Eighth Circuit also applies the extrinsic/intrinsic test, but it uses 
an interpretation of the test similar to the Fourth Circuit. 152 The Eighth Cir-
cuit has not applied the Fourth Circuit's intended audience test, 153 and copy-
right litigation in the circuit is fairly sparse. 154 
3. The Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test 
The abstraction-filtration-comparison test was adopted in modified 
form by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International v. Altai, 
Inc. 155 in reaction to the "overly expansive approach to software protec-
tion"156 invoked by the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow 
Dental Laboratory, Inc. 157 The test has since been adopted by the Tenth, 
Sixth, and D.C. Circuits and applied to cases involving a variety of subject 
matters. 158 Under the Tenth Circuit's abstraction-filtration-comparison test, 
149. !d. § 3:2.2[A]. 
150. Adults are not always the intended audience for a work. See id. § 3:2.2[C]. In 
claims involving products intended for children, the children themselves are the best judges 
of substantial similarity. Id. Therefore, in a dispute involving similar costumes resembling 
Barney, the jolly, big purple dinosaur character in a popular television show for children, the 
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the costumes should have been compared from the point 
of view of their intended audience-children. Id. 
151. /d. For instance, in Integral Systems, Inc. v Peoplesofl, Inc., a reasonable person 
to compare the computer software works at issue would be a person with knowledge of hu-
man resource management systems. See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.2; 
see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992). 
152. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:2.3. The Eighth Circuit takes its 
version of the extrinsic/intrinsic test from Moore v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., an 
Eighth Circuit case decided after Krafft and before Shaw. I d. 
153. See id. But see 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:224 ("The Eighth Circuit does not 
see a great deal of copyright litigation, but the court of appeals' opinions have been very 
well-thought out, traditional efforts, generally following the Second Circuit's two-step ap-
proach to infringement analysis."). 
154. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:224. 
155. Id. § 9:94. 
156. !d. 
Regrettably, however, egged on by a grandiose claim that courts should apply the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison "across the gamut of copyright law," its ac-
ceptance has begun to spread. So far the application and/or misapplication of the 
doctrine has been worse in the Tenth Circuit, which has applied the test to cartoon 
strips, paper dolls, and telephone directories. 
!d. (quoting 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § )3.03[F][l] (2012)). 
157. 797 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (3d Cir. 1986). 
158. OSTERBERG &OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:3. 
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the fact finder looks at the elements of the work generally, or in the "ab-
stract," separating protectable expression from unprotectable ideas. 159 Then, 
unprotectable elements are filtered from the original expression, 160 and the 
remaining protectable elements are compared to the allegedly infringing 
work, from the perspective of the ordinary observer, to determine if the 
works are substantially similar. 161 
In Kohus v. Mario/, 162 the Sixth Circuit announced its new standard-a 
variation on the abstraction-filtration-comparison-in 2003. 163 The test, 
sometimes called "filtration/comparison by intended audience," involves 
two parts. 164 First, the court identifies the protectable elements of the plain-
tiff's work and, in the same step, filters out the unoriginal, unprotectable 
elements. 165 Second, the works are compared from the perspective of the 
intended audience. 166 In both steps, expert testimony may be admitted. 167 
The D.C. Circuit is confronted with less traditional copyright litigation 
than the other circuits, 168 but it generally applies a two-step filtra-
tion/comparison test in which the comparison of the filtered elements and 
the overall look and feel of the works are gauged by an ordinary observer. 169 
However, in cases where the plaintiff's work does not contain unprotectable 
elements, the D.C. Circuit simply applies the ordinary observer test of the 
Second Circuit. 170 
The approaches of the Eleventh Circuit and the Federal Circuit Court 
of Appeals cannot be characterized by a single substantial similarity test. 
The Eleventh Circuit advocates an "ad hoc" approach that is consistent with 
159. /d. § 3:3.1. 
160. /d. In terms of a literary work, such unprotectable ideas to be filtered out from 
the final comparison between the protectable expressions of the two works may include 
common plots and themes, historical facts in the public domain, and scenes afaire. 
161. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:3.1. 
162. 328 F.3d 848 (6th Cir. 2003). 
163. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:3.2. "Until 2003, the Sixth Circuit 
had not adopted a specific test for analyzing substantial similarity in copyright cases," nor 
did its district courts consistently apply a single test. !d. "Most evaluated substantial similari-
ty by means of the ordinary observer test," but some also used the Ninth Circuit extrin-
sic/intrinsic test. !d. 
164. /d. 
165. !d. ("The court specifically identified ideas, elements dictated by efficiency, and 
scenes a faire as elements to be filtered out before comparing the works. In a later case, 
Murray Hill Publ'ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the court added another item 
to the list of elements to be filtered-independently created elements." (footnote omitted)). 
166. !d. 
167. /d. 
168. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:267 ("There is little traditional copyright litigation 
in the District of Columbia Circuit."). 
169. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:3.3. 
170. /d. 
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the "traditional analysis," 171 generally treating copyright infringement as "a 
question of fact for the jury to decide." 172 Alternatively, the Federal Circuit 
Court of Appeals applies the law of the jurisdiction from which the appeal is 
taken. 173 
Ill. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Availability of Relevant Resources 
Since this empirical study is the first to address the substantial similar-
ity tests and related case law, much of the methodology necessarily follows 
from other works of statistical legal scholarship. 174 There are resources, 
some more comprehensive than others, on different types of intellectual 
property: the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office offers searchable online 
databases for trademarks and patents; 175 the University of Houston Law 
Center and the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation Clearinghouse each 
provide private online databases that offer information and statistics about 
patent disputes; 176 the official directory of the U.S. federal courts provides 
annual reports and statistics; 177 and there are scholarly articles with statisti-
cal analyses that focus on patents, 178 trademarks, 179 trade secrets, 180 and the 
171. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:258 ("Case law in the Eleventh Circuit is mostly 
devoid of the tendency in other events to announce grand infringement tests .... "). 
172. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:4.1. 
173. ld. § 3:5. 
174. Parts of this study were modeled after and benefited greatly from Professor 
Beebe's empirical scholarship of fair use opinions. See Beebe, supra note 10, at 582-97; see 
also Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 63, 100-20 (2008) (presenting best practices after collecting examples of 
empirical legal scholarship that analyzed judicial opinions as part of a content analysis); 
DavidS. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 
45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 295-301 (2009). 
175. The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office permits the searching of patents at 
http://patft.uspto.gov/ and trademarks at http://tess2.uspto.gov/. The U.S. Copyright Office 
permits searching at http://www.copyright.gov/records/. 
176. The University of Houston Law Center provides statistics on forty issues in 
patent cases at http://www.patstats.org/, and the Stanford Intellectual Property Litigation 
Clearinghouse offers information about IP disputes within the United States at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/centers/iplc/. 
177. The annual reports and statistics of the U.S. federal courts can be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx; the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office provides annu-
al statistics relating to patents and trademarks at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stats/index.jsp; 
and annual statistics of the U.S. Copyright Office can be found at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/. 
178. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2100 (2000). 
179. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2006); Ash Nagdev, Statistical Analysis of the 
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fair use doctrine in copyright law. 181 Yet, despite the wealth of available 
information pertaining to other intellectual property doctrines and notwith-
standing the enormous amount of scholarly criticism that the substantial 
similarity tests and cases have received, there lacks any empirical resources 
or comprehensive account of substantial similarity case law. 
The reasons for this deficiency are numerous, but two are key. First, 
while the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the Federal 
Judicial Center do systematically track data for patent, trademark, and copy-
right cases, it does so only generally. 182 That is, all copyright actions are 
indiscriminately aggregated into a single category under the broad umbrella 
of copyright law, such that fair use cases, copyrightability cases, and sub-
stantial similarity cases are indistinguishable from one another. 183 Second, 
the concept of substantial similarity does not easily lend itself to statistical 
analysis; there is no uniform standard. Unlike the likelihood of confusion 
test used to analyze trademark infringement claims, there are no prongs; 
and, unlike the fair use test of copyright infringement, there are no specific 
factors. 184 Instead, not only are there several substantial similarity tests em-
ployed throughout the circuits, but also each circuit can be inconsistent in its 
application of a particular test, resulting in opinions that-Qn the whole-
seem too scattered to code and classify reliably. There can be no doubt that 
these difficulties, coupled with the "necessary vagueness of the substantiali-
ty inquiry," 185 have hindered a clean-cut analysis of substantial similarity 
case law, but such hardships by no means preclude a thorough empirical 
study with important preliminary results. 186 
United States' Accession to the Madrid Protocol, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 211, 214 
(2008). 
180. See Almeling et al., supra note 174, at 301. 
181. See generally Beebe, supra note 10. 
182. See Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts Database: An Initial Empirical Analysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 1455, 1456 (2003); Almeling et al., supra note 174, at 296 (noting that the "data in-
clude information about every case filed in federal courts, such as the subject matter of the 
case, the parties, and outcome"). 
183. Almeling et al., supra note 174, at 296. 
184. Beebe, supra note 10, at 556. 
185. 3 PATRY, supra note 96, § 9:64 (noting that "no a priori line can be fixed to 
determine when appropriation is substantial"); see, e.g., Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 
172 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 
1930). 
186. In fact, research has uncovered a small number of substantial similarity analyses 
that have, in some way, contributed data relative to substantial similarity. 
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B. Analysis of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Year 
This empirical study set out to include all reported federal appellate 
court opinions that made a ruling on the issue of substantial similarity and 
applied one of the several substantial similarity tests. Since there was no 
pre-built search or previous study listing all substantial similarity cases 
meeting these criteria, an over-broad search was conducted; 187 and any un-
suitable cases were removed. Collecting the most frequently cited cases and 
eliminating those that made no ruling on the issue of substantial similarity 
resulted in a preliminary data set of 338 circuit court cases. Cases that were 
decided under a different rule of law, such as copyrightability or striking 
similarity, were also removed, leaving a total of 234 circuit court cases 
spanning from April2, 1923 to September 14, 2011. 188 
l. Distribution of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Year 
Importantly, over 80% of the 234 appellate opinions collected-
spanning from 1923 to 20 11-were issued from 1980 to 2011, equating to a 
surprisingly low, yet explicable, average of 6.5 opinions per year during the 
thirty-one year period, with an average of 1.9 opinions per year ruling for 
the copyright holders in finding substantial similarity. 189 Figure I shows the 
187. To collect a sample of the relevant opinions, I ran the following Lexis search in 
the Lexis Federal Circuit Court Cases, Combined database: copyright and "substantial! simi-
lar!" and date(geq (4/23/1923) and leq(9/14/2011)). I then ran the following Westlaw search 
in the Westlaw All Federal Circuit Court Cases database: copyright & "substantial! similar!" 
& da(aft 1923) & da(bef 2011 ). I then reviewed the Lexis and Westlaw search results to 
identify any opinions reported uniquely in either Lexis or Westlaw. This review yielded a 
total 338 opinions from the two databases. Along with research assistants, I then read each of 
these opinions to exclude those that did not involve in any way an issue of copyright substan-
tial similarity and excluded additional opinions as irrelevant or only marginally relevant to 
copyright substantial similarity. Of the remaining opinions, 234 made considerable use of a 
substantial similarity test. Research assistants then coded each of the opinions directly into an 
Excel 2010 SP2 spreadsheet according to a coding instrument, did the same in a new spread-
sheet a second time, and then I compared the two spreadsheets for errors. The coding instru-
ment was designed to record general data about the opinion (e.g., caption, citation, judge, 
venue, posture, brief summary of the facts) and copyright-specific data about the opinion 
(e.g., the substantial similarity test applied by the court, the disposition of the infringement 
claim, type of subject matter involved in the claim). The coding instrument and Excel 
spreadsheet are available upon request from the author. 
188. According to one Westlaw representative, Westlaw's database includes compre-
hensive coverage of all reported and published decisions since 1789. See Mary Rumsey, A 
Guide to Fee-Based U.S. Legal Research Databases, GLOBALEX (last updated Mar. 2010), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/US _Fee-Based_ Legal_ Databases l.htm ("Westlaw 
generally offers complete coverage back to the earliest case."). Thus, the fact that there are so 
few cases in earlier years is likely not a sampling issue. 
189. Beebe, supra note 10, at 565 (explaining that the disparity between the high 
approximate number of copyright infringement complaints and the "paucity of reported fair 
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distribution by year of the 234 circuit court opinions studied. The data 
shows a significant jump in the average number of substantial similarity 
opinions after 1980, which peaks in the early 2000s. 
Figure 1: Distribution of Circuit 






One explanation for the increase in opinions after 1980 is the appear-
ance of substantial similarity decisions involving computer software, which 
began to surface in the early 1980s. 190 A similar trend was noted by at least 
one scholar with the appearance of fair use case law involving computer 
software in 1988, followed by disputes involving Internet technology. 191 
Furthermore, although fair use is a copyright law doctrine separate from the 
concept of substantial similarity, it is hardly unlikely that the United States 
Supreme Court's four majority opinions addressing fair use between 1984 
and 1994 did not have some effect on the influx of substantial similarity 
decisions during this time. 192 The early 2000s peak in the data may reflect, 
use opinions" is likely due to the fact that many fair use disputes are "chilled" by the mere 
threat of litigation). Such a tendency is likely to also translate to substantial similarity case 
law. See MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE?: FREE EXPRESSION IN 
THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 8, 35-36 (2005), available at 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WiiiFairUseSurvive.pdf. (assessing the speech-
suppressing effects of cease-and-desist letters though empirical research). 
190. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,911 (2d Cir. 1980); 
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985); Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures 
Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th 
Cir. 1984); Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984). 
191. Beebe, supra note I 0, at 566. 
192. /d. 
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at least in part, the "RIAA Bump." 193 In the five-year period between 2003 
and 2008, U.S. copyright cases nearly doubled as the Recording Industry 
Association of America (RlAA) launched its "litigation campaign" against 
online file sharers. 194 Though RIAA lawsuits admittedly fall under a copy-
right infringement cause of action separate from the substantial similarity 
doctrine, 195 it is worth noting that 19.5% of this study's substantial similarity 
opinions issued between 2003 and 2008 involve music. This is a notable 
difference from the previous five years, between 1997 and 2002, in which 
only 12.5% of the opinions involve music. But while the recording indus-
try's aggressive legal strategy reached its height in 2005, and new federal 
copyright infringement lawsuits have dropped every year thereafter, 196 inde-
pendent filmmakers are now following suit, launching "an RIAA-style 
mass-litigation campaign" against thousands of BitTorrent197 users who 
have illegally downloaded movies from the Intemet. 198 Thus, given the con-
stant flow of innovative technologies and new media, it would be unreason-
able to expect the number of copyright infringement dockets to return to a 
pre-1980 status any time soon. 
2. Substantial Similarity Win Rates by Year 
Of the 234 opinions studied, 32.3% found copyright infringement on 
the basis of substantial similarity, while the copyright holder lost on the 
substantial similarity claim in 67.7% of the cases. Figure 2 sets out the per-
centage of opinions in which substantial similarity was found for each of the 
nine decades between 1920 and 2010. From the 1930s through the 1970s, 
the percentage of opinions finding substantial similarity increased by an 
average of 8.6% each decade, with the peak occurring in the 1970s, during 
which 62.5% of the decisions fell in favor of the copyright holder. Yet, this 
193. David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, 
WIRED (May 18, 20 I 0, I :24 PM), http://www. wired.com/threatlevel/20 I 0/05/riaa-bump/. 
194. ld. 
195. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 
1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
196. The drop in litigation might also be partly a product of the recession. "In inter-
views with Threat Level, copyright attorneys were in agreement that the termination of the 
litigation campaign is largely responsible for last year's low numbers, though economic 
conditions may also have played a role. 'When economic times are bad, lawsuits drop,' says 
New York copyright attorney Ray Dowd." Kravets, supra note 193. 
197. I d. BitTorrent is one of the most common file sharing protocols on the Internet. 
Hyunggon Park, Rafit Izhak Ratzin, & Mihaela van der Schaar, Peer-to-Peer Networks-
Protocols, Coorperation and Competition, I, 2 
http:/ /medianetlab.ee.ucla.edu/papers/chapter _P2P _ hpark.pdf. 
198. David Kravets, lndie Filmmakers Sue Thousands of BitTorrent Users, WIRED 
(Mar. 31, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://www. wired.com/threatlevel/20 I 0/03/bittorrent-legal-
attack/. 
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peak was met with a sharp decline beginning in the 1980s, with only 36.4% 
of opinions finding substantial similarity, and even fewer in the 1990s. 
Figure 2: Percentage of Opinions Finding 
Substantial Similarity by Decade 
62.5% 
One possible explanation for the steady increase from the 1930s 
through the 1970s is the introduction and assimilation of several early 
landmark decisions, including Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. in 
1930, 199 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp. in 1936,200 and Arnstein 
v. Porter in 1946.201 Although Nichols, the earliest of the three, ruled in the 
defendant's favor, holding that "the defendant took no more-assuming that 
it took anything at all-than the law allowed,"202 both the Sheldon and Arn-
stein held in favor of the copyright holder. 203 Such decisions may have been 
influential in the willingness of subsequent courts to find infringement on 
the basis of substantial similarity, at least until the 1980s. 
199. 45F.2d 119, 120(2dCir. 1930). 
200. 81 F.2d 49, 50-52 (2d Cir. 1936) (reversing the district court's finding and hold-
ing that the defendant's photoplay, Letty Lynton, was substantially similar to the plaintiff's 
play, Dishonored Lady, both ofwhich involved the acquittal of a wanton young woman who 
poisoned her lover). 
201. 154 F.2d 464,473 (2d Cir. 1946) (reversing the district court's finding that the 
defendant's songs were not substantially similar, and remanding the case for a jury trial since 
the decision as to whether the two songs were substantially similar enough to constitute 
infringement was a matter of fact for the jury to decide). 
202. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. "A comedy based upon conflicts between Irish and 
Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright 
than the outline of Romeo and Juliet." !d. at 122. 
203. Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 56; Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473. 
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Still another distinguishing characteristic ofthe opinions published be-
tween the 1930s and the 1970s is the application of the ordinary observer 
test in nearly all of the decisions. It was not until the late 1970s that other 
substantial similarity tests began to proliferate in the judicial landscape. Of 
course, pre-1980s case law also dealt with a more limited variety of subject 
matters, which included neither computer programs nor architectural 
works, 204 and may have resulted in simpler, easier-to-decide substantial sim-
ilarity determinations. 205 
Figure 3 excludes opinions decided before 1970 to provide a more de-
tailed illustration of the substantial similarity win rates over the forty-year 
period between 1970 and 2010. As shown, the percentage of cases in which 
copyright holders prevailed declined precipitously throughout the 1970s and 
most of the 1990s. Substantial similarity win rates were lowest during the 
five-year period between 1995 and 2000, with only 21.6% of the opinions 
finding substantial similarity. Such a significant downturn may reflect the 
impact of then-recent decisions that either outlined a new test or applied an 
old test in a new way. Sure enough, of the aforementioned opinions in 
which new substantial similarity tests were delineated, only Sid & Marty 
Kroffl Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 206 and the lesser-
cited Country Kids 'N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen 207 favored the copyright 
holder, finding substantial similarity. Conversely, both Folio Impressions, 
Inc. v. Eyer California208 and Computer Associates International, Inc. v. 
Altai, Inc. 209 upheld bench trial verdicts favoring the defendants, plausibly 
ushering in the trend toward lower substantial similarity win rates. 
204. Subject matter categories included in pre-1980s case law are literary works, 
factual works, musical works, and graphic works (graphic, pictorial, and sculptural works). 
205. See Gable, supra note 29, at 447 (describing "'a state of creative ferment con-
cerning the methods by which non literal elements of computer programs may be identified 
and analyzed for copyrightability"' (quoting Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, 
Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994))); Jack E. Brown, "Analytical Dissection" a/Copy-
righted Computer Software-Complicating the Simple and Confounding the Complex, 25 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801, 822 (1993). 
206. 562 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 1977) (affirming the district court's jury trial 
verdict finding substantial similarity between the defendant's "McDonaldland" advertising 
campaign and the plaintiff's children's television show, "H. R. Pufnstuf'). 
207. 77 F.3d 1280, 1282-83 (lOth Cir. 1996). 
208. 937 F.2d 759,761-62 (2d Cir. 1991). 
209. 982 F.2d 693, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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A final observation concerning the substantial similarity win rates be-
tween 1970 and 2010 deserves exploration that is beyond the scope of this 
study, but is nonetheless worth mentioning. During this forty-year period, 
five U.S. Supreme Court cases addressing copyright law were published-
one of them involving copyrightability-Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co. (1991)210-and four of them involving fair use-
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (1984),211 Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises (1985), 212 Stewart v. Abend 
(1990), 213 and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. (1994). 214 The Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the copyright holder in only two of these cases, 
namely Harper & Row, Publishers and Stewart, 215 while holding in favor of 
the alleged infringer in Feist Publications, Sony, and Campbell, thus con-
ceivably expanding the toolkit of defenses available to an alleged infring-
er. 216 Although the data set collected for this study was not designed to ere-
210. 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (holding that data compiled in telephone directory 
were uncopyrightable facts). 
211. 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984). 
212. 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (holding that unauthorized publication of key verbatim 
selections from unpublished presidential memoirs was not a fair use). 
213. 495 U.S. 207,236 (1990). 
214. 510 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1994) (holding that the musical group 2 Live Crew's 
appropriation of certain elements of Roy Orbison' s song "Oh, Pretty Woman" in its parody 
of the song constituted a fair use). 
215. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 542; Stewart, 495 U.S. at 238. 
216. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991); Sony 
Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 420-21; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. 
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ate a link between substantial similarity case law and other copyright doc-
trines, it is possible that such a link exists. Substantial similarity and fair use 
no doubt occupy two distinct and conceptually insulated tiers of infringe-
ment analysis, but Campbell, the most prominent copyright opinion written 
in decades, may have tipped the scale in favor of the alleged infringers. By 
ruling for the defendant parodist and against the copyright holder, Campbell 
gave public interests priority in the balance between public interests and 
individual rights. 217 Consequently, this decision may have induced a trend in 
substantial similarity decisions to construe the boundaries of infringement 
more liberally, absolving more alleged infringers from liability and impact-
ing the decline in substantial similarity win rates through the mid-1990s. 218 
C. Analysis of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Circuit and Test Applied 
Evidenced by the multitude of proposals to reformulate, reconcile, and 
abolish the substantial similarity tests, there can be no doubt that the sub-
stantial similarity doctrine has perplexed students, scholars, and courts for 
decades. 219 Still, the Supreme Court has yet to mandate a universal standard 
to aid the copyright infringement inquiry, and so the inevitable question 
arises: why not? Perhaps the clearest answer is that, despite their conten-
tious and difficult application, the tests are not mutually exclusive. 220 Even 
so, if substantial similarity win rates differ drastically among the circuits 
and according to the test that is applied, the argument for intervention is 
strengthened, shifting the impetus for change from a desire for clarity to a 
need for equity. To determine whether and to what extent such an inequity 
exists, an analysis of the substantial similarity win rates in each circuit was 
conducted, in addition to a separate examination of the substantial similarity 
win rates according to the test applied in each of the cases studied. 
1. Distribution of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Circuit and Test 
Applied 
As shown in Table 1, a majority of the opinions studied were from the 
Second and Ninth Circuits, collectively accounting for 55.6% of the total 
217. See 510 U.S. at 578 n.IO. 
218. See supra Figure 3. 
219. See, e.g., 2 ABRAMS, supra note 64, § 14:41; JOHN W. HAZARD, JR., CoPYRIGHT 
LAW IN BUSINESS AND PRACTICE§ 7:27 (rev. ed. 2011). 
220. Alan J. Hartnick, The Osterbergs' Substantial Similarity in Copyright Law, 51 J. 
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 243, 243 (2003) (book review) (noting that '"there is more than 
one test for copyright infringement and the tests are not mutually exclusive"' (quoting Robert 
Bernstein & Robert W. Clarida, 'Ay There's the Rug,' N.Y. L.J., Sept., 19, 2003, at 3)). 
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sample, and contributing 30.8% and 24.8%, respectively. 221 Within those 
circuits, 26.9% and 15.0% of the total cases in this study originated in the 
Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) and the Central District of Cali-
fornia (C.D. Cal.). 222 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits each contributed 7.3% 
of the opinions studied, the Fifth Circuit accounted for 5.6% of the opinions, 
and each of the seven remaining circuits comprised less than 5% of the 234 
opinions. 223 
221. See infra Table I. In his empirical study of fair use opinions, Professor Beebe 
likewise found that the district and circuit courts of the Second and Ninth Circuits dominated 
the sample: the Second Circuit courts accounted for 38.6% of the circuit court opinions, and 
the Ninth Circuit courts were responsible for 28.4% of the circuit court opinions. Beebe, 
supra note I 0, at 567. 
222. See infra Table 1. At the district court level, Professor Beebe also found that the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York "alone accounted for 31.3% of the 
district court opinions, with the Northern District of California next at 7.6%." Beebe, supra 
note 10, at 567. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Opinions by 
Circuit and District 
n "/o District n 
II 4.7% D. Mass. 8 
D.Me. I 
P.R. I 
73 30.8% S.D.N.Y. 63 
E.D.N.Y. 8 
W.D.N.Y. I 
D. Vt. I 
7 3.0% D.N.J. 3 
E.D. Pa. 2 
W.D.Pa. I 
W.O. Penn. I 





13 5.6% S.D. Tex 5 
N.D. Tex. 5 
E.D. La. 2 
S.D. Fla. I 
S.D. Miss. I 
17 7.3% E.D. Mich. 9 
M.D. Tenn. 3 
S.D. Ohio 2 
E.D. Tenn I 
N.D. Ohio I 
W.D.Mich. I 
8 3.4% N.D. IlL 6 
N.D. Ind. I 
S.D.Ind I 
9 3.8% D. Minn. 6 
W.D.Mo. 2 
W.D.Mo. I 
58 24.8% CD. CaL 35 
N.D. CaL 8 
S.D. CaL 8 
D. Ariz. 2 
D. Alaska I 
D. Hawaii I 
D. Idaho I 
D.C. Cal I 
D. Nev. I 
II 4.7% D. Colo. 4 
D.N.M. 2 
D. Utah 2 
W.D.Okla. 2 
D.Kan. I 
17 7.3% S.D. Fla. 8 
M.D. Fla. 4 
N.D. Ga. 3 
N.D.A1a. 1 
S.D. Ga. 1 
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Consistent with the statuses of the Second and Ninth Circuits as the 
leading copyright courts, certain subject matters dominated in the circuits.224 
In the Second Circuit, 39.7% of the opinions involved subject matters with-
in the category of graphic, pictorial, and sculptural works, followed closely 
by 32.8% of opinions involving literary works. Cases from the Ninth Circuit 
largely involved literary works and computer software, each of which ac-
counted for 48.3% and 17.2% respectively, of the circuit's opinions. Thus, 
substantial similarity case law has been, and still is, largely influenced by 
traditional, non-electronic media. 225 
To reliably address the various approaches to the substantial similarity 
tests used among the circuits, a content analysis of the opinions was con-
ducted, and the test applied in each case was categorized. Including two 
versions for the three substantial similarity tests resulted in six distinct cate-
gories: the ordinary observer test, the more discerning ordinary observer 
test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test with the intended 
audience test, the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, and the abstraction-
filtration by the intended audience test. 226 Not surprisingly, because the Sec-
ond Circuit's approach is the longest standing and most-favored among the 
circuits,227 the ordinary observer test represented 54.7% of the 234 opinions. 
The extrinsic/intrinsic test was applied in 27.8% of the opinions, and the 
abstraction-filtration-comparison test was used in 7.2% of the opinions. 
Interestingly, disputes requiring a more discerning or specialized audience 
comprised only 10.3% of the opinions-with 3.8% applying the more dis-
cerning ordinary observer test, 3.4% applying the extrinsic/intrinsic test 
with the intended audience test, and 3.0% applying the abstraction-filtration 
by the intended audience test. 
2. Substantial Similarity Win Rates by Circuit and Test Applied 
Figure 4 displays the percentage of opinions in which substantial simi-
larity was found-and the copyright holder thus prevailed-for each of the 
circuits. Substantial similarity win rates were the highest in the Seventh 
Circuit and the Third Circuit, with 62.5% and 57.1% of the opinions favor-
ing the copyright holder, respectively. The remaining circuits contained case 
law that was skewed in favor of the defendant. The Eleventh Circuit-with 
11.8%-and the Fifth Circuit-with 15.4%-had the lowest substantial 
224. Beebe, supra note I 0, at 572 ("Notwithstanding scholarly emphasis on fair use 
and new media, traditional two-dimensional nonvirtual print media have dominated and 
continue to dominate the facts of American fair use case law."). Not surprisingly, the same is 
true of substantial similarity case law. 
225. !d. at 572-73. 
226. See supra Section II.B. 
227. See supra Section II.B. 
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similarity win rates. The substantial similarity win rates were relatively con-
sistent for the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits, ranging between 23.5% and 37.5o/o--all finding for the copyright 
holder. 
1st 2d 3d 
Figure 4: Percentage of Opinions Finding 
Substantial Similarity by Circuit 
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As shown in Figure 5, the opinions applying the more discerning ordi-
nary observer test featured a substantial similarity win rate of 55.6%, the 
highest of the tests. The lowest substantial similarity win rates, 23.5% and 
25.0%, were found in opinions using the abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test and the extrinsic/intrinsic test with the intended audience test, respec-
tively.228 Remarkably, however, when collapsing the six substantial similari-
ty tests into the three main tests-the ordinary observer test, the extrin-
sic/intrinsic test, and the abstraction-filtration-comparison test-their sub-
stantial similarity win rates become closely aligned. 229 Hence, the percent-
228. Further research is required to determine if these win rate percentages would be 
different if the sample size was larger. There were fewer opinions that utilized the special-
ized versions of the substantial similarity tests. For instance, of the 234 opinions, 9 opinions 
applied the more discerning ordinary observer test, 8 opinions applied the extrinsic/intrinsic 
test with intended audience test, and 7 opinions applied the abstraction-filtration by the in-
tended audience test. By comparison, 128 opinions applied the ordinary observer test, 65 
applied the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and 17 applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test. 
229. Rather than considering each of the six tests in isolation, the opinions were then 
distributed into three groups based on which of the three main "root" tests was applied. Thus, 
the opinions applying the ordinary observer test and the more discerning ordinary observer 
test were combined (n = 137); the opinions applying the extrinsic/intrinsic test and extrin-
sic/intrinsic test with intended audience test were combined (n = 73); and the opinions apply-
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age of opinions finding substantial similarity is 32.8% for the ordinary ob-
server test, 25.0% for the extrinsic/intrinsic test, and 23.5% for the abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison test. Certainly, such a finding shows that substan-
tial similarity cases overwhelmingly tend to fall in favor of the alleged in-
fringers, but it reveals something more. If one pays no heed to additional 
variables, 230 the probability that the copyright holder will prevail remains 
the same, regardless of which test is applied. This conclusion plausibly 
weakens the argument that one of the tests should be abolished in favor of 
the other or that one is more disadvantageous to either party. Consequently, 
at least in terms of overall substantial similarity win rates, if there is an in-
equity underlying the case law, it should not be attributed to the tests alone. 
Figure 5: Percentage of Opinions Finding 
Substantial Similarity by Test Applied 
55.6~. 
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D. Analysis of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Subject Matter 
The opinions were divided into six different categories of subject mat-
ter: literary works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; musical works; 
computer software; factual works; and architectural works. 
ing the abstraction-filtration-comparison test and abstraction-filtration by the intended audi-
ence test were combined (n = 24). See supra Section II.B. 
230. Additional variables would include the subject matter of copyrightable work at 
issue, the posture of the case, and the circuit court hearing the appeal, among others. Such 
variables undoubtedly have an effect on the ultimate outcome of the case, but this study 
argues that if the opinions are distributed into three groups based solely on the substantial 
similarity test applied by the court--(\) the ordinary observer test (and more discerning 
ordinary observer test); (2) the extrinsic/intrinsic test (and extrinsic/intrinsic test with intend-
ed audience test); or (3) the abstraction-filtration-comparison test (and abstraction-filtration 
by the intended audience test)-the likelihood that the copyright holder will prevail remains 
unchanged, regardless of which test is used. See supra Section II.B. 
Computer 
software 
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Figure 6: Percentage of Opinions Finding 













1. Literary Works: Distribution and Substantial Similarity Win Rate 
Comprising 31.2% of the opinions studied, literary works were the 
largest subject matter category. However, the substantial similarity win rate 
for literary works when the plaintiff prevailed was only 20.5%. To simplify 
the substantial similarity analysis, courts boil down the difference between 
fictional literary and dramatic works as stories with different manners of 
expression: literary fiction is expressed with words on paper, while dramatic 
fiction is expressed with action on a screen. 231 Thus, regardless of the medi-
um, courts apply the same substantial similarity analysis to all stories, first 
plucking out their constituent elements-"plot/sequence of events, dialogue, 
characters, theme, mood, setting, and pace"-and scrutinizing each to de-
termine the extent of similarities between the two works, then parsing them 
back together to compare their overall impressions. 232 However, distinguish-
231. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 431 
(1984). 
232. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 4. "To determine whether two fic-
tional literary or dramatic works are substantially similar, courts generally analyze seven 
concrete elements, and they also evaluate the overall impression created by the works at 
issue." /d. The concrete elements are "plot/sequence of events, dialogue, characters, theme, 
mood, setting, and pace." !d. "No one element will control the overall impression, but 
plot/sequence of events, dialogue and characters seem often to be the most influential." /d. 
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ing between unprotectable literary ideas and an author's protectable expres-
sion is infamously difficult. 233 
The use of similar scenes a faire, historical facts, generic parallels, 
random words, trite comments, writing styles, and structures cannot justify a 
finding of substantial similarity. 234 For instance, scenes a faire, the indispen-
sable scenes that '"must' be done"235 to convey a topic are too "common-
place"236 to be protectable. 237 Thus, creativity aside, copyright law does not 
protect the inclusion of drunks, vermin, and derelict cars, for example, in a 
realistic work about policemen working in the South Bronx ofNew York;238 
"parties, alcohol, co-eds and wild behavior ... in a story about a college 
fratemity"; 239 escapes, flights through the woods with pursuit by barking 
dogs, singing slaves, and the atrocity of buying and selling people in a story 
about slavery; 240 "electrified fences, automated tours, dinosaur nurseries, 
and uniformed workers" in a story about a dinosaur zoo; 241 or "security 
cameras, violence, a police man [sic] doing his duty, and the countdown of 
time" in a story about a robbery. 242 
Likewise, since courts agree that there are a finite number of dramatic 
situations that form the basis of all human drama, similarity between the 
plot and sequence of two works is not an infringement. 243 Consequently, any 
story about forbidden love that leads to the tragic death of one of the lovers 
is viewed as little more than a retelling of Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet 
play. 244 The same can be said of stories about egotistical men trapped in a 
repeated day who transform into a caring person, "white individuals who 
overcome racism through relationships with a black helper[, or] aliens who 
come to Earth. "245 
233. "The test is necessarily vague and nothing more definite can be said about it." § 
4:1 n.l5. 
234. /d. 
235. Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270, 275 (S.D. Cal. 1945). 
236. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 850 (9th Cir. 2004). 
237. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 2:3.3. The concept has been extended 
to music, architecture, and beyond. See generally id. 
238. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986). 
239. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283,296 (6th Cir. 2004). 
240. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
241. Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581,589 (2d Cir. 1996). 
242. Robinson v. New Line Cinema Corp., 42 F. Supp. 2d 578, 592 (D. Md. 1999). 
243. Desny v. Wilder, 46 Cal. 2d 715, 741 (1946) ("'There are only thirty-six funda-
mental dramatic situations, various facets of which form the basis of all human drama.' It is 
manifest that authors must work with and from ideas or themes which basically are in the 
public domain." (citation omitted)). 
244. See id. 
245. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 4 (footnote omitted) ("Many in-
fringement claims have failed because similarities in the general pattern or skeleton of the 
plot were not accompanied by protected details of expression."). 
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2. Pictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works: Distribution and Sub-
stantial Similarity Win Rate 
549 
Opinions involving pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, otherwise 
considered "works of visual art,"246 comprised 29.9% of the opinions stud-
ied. The considerable size of this broadly defined category might be a re-
flection of the diverse subject matters within it: illustrations and paintings; 
fabric, carpet, and wall covering designs; stuffed animals; dolls, sculptural 
objects, and figurines; clothing; games; and maps. Unlike dramatic fiction 
and literary fiction, which courts indiscriminately group together and ana-
lyze in the same way, each subcategory of visual work is analyzed in a 
slightly different way. 247 This tailored approach may explain the significant-
ly higher substantial similarity win rate in this category of 52.9%. In fact, 
not only do opinions involving visual works have the highest win rate, they 
are also the only subject matter category that is more likely to favor the 
copyright holder than the alleged infringer. 
3. Musical Works: Distribution and Substantial Similarity Win Rate 
Opinions that addressed facts involving music comprised 12.8% of the 
opinions studied and included both the oldest case in the sample and one of 
the most influential. In 1923, Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc. 248 formulated the 
"substantiality test. " 249 In 1946, Arnstein v. Porter articulated the "ordinary 
observer test,"250 an approach that the Second Circuit still adheres to for 
musical works and all other subject matters, with few exceptions. 251 The 
substantial similarity win rate for disputes involving musical works was 
21.4%, only slightly higher than that of literary works. 252 
Music also consists of two distinct protectable parts: the music and 
lyrics written by the composer and the sound recording of the written music 
being performed by the musicians. 253 Interestingly, the two parts are gov-
246. /d. § I 0. 
247. !d. 
248. 290 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1923). 
249. Raphael Metzger, Name that Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of Musical 
Plagiarism, 5 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 61, 71 n.55 (1985), available at 
http:/ /digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 067 &context=elr ("[T]he sub-
stantiality test prohibits all substantial copying, whereas the audience test forbids only sub-
stantial copying which is aurally perceptible to the average person."). 
250. 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see Metzger, supra note 249, at 78-83. 
251. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3 n.l ("[T]he Second Circuit in Arn-
stein required that plaintiffs prove both (I) copying and (2) illicit copying (unlawful appro-
priation) to establish infringement. The Second Circuit still adheres to that approach."). 
252. See supra Figure 6. 
253. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, §§ 3.1.1 [B], 3:2.1 [B]. 
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emed under different sections of the Copyright Act.254 Hence, the sound 
recording is protected only from actual reproduction of the recording, while 
the music and lyrics are subject to the substantial similarity analysis. In-
fringement can be found on the basis of the music, the lyrics, or both. 255 
Courts treat lyrics as literary works, similar to poems, but they regard music 
as "complex expression"256 and "often rely [] on expert testimony to assist in 
the determination of substantial similarity."257 
4. Computer Programs: Distribution and Substantial Similarity Win 
Rate 
The percentage of opinions addressing facts involving computer soft-
ware was 12.4%, relatively equal to the proportion of opinions involving 
musical works. However, the first substantial similarity case involving 
computer software in our sample did not appear until 1982, nearly sixty 
years after the first cases addressing songs. 258 Consequently, from 1982 to 
2011, opinions involving computer software became more frequent than 
opinions involving music, with computer software cases contributing 15.4% 
and music cases contributing 11.8% of the total opinions. Opinions involv-
ing computer software had a 30.0% substantial similarity win rate, with the 
copyright holder prevailing. 259 
Computer programs are thought to comprise both a literary work, 
which includes the program's code, and an audiovisual work, which is the 
"graphical user interface" that consists of the pictures and sounds generated 
by the program to the user. 260 To establish substantial similarity, either the 
computer program's code or its user interface must be copied, 261 but com-
puter programs are also protected as compilations. 262 Since 1992, when the 
254. !d. The copyright in the music is governed by § I 06 of the Copyright Act. 17 
U.S. C. § 106 (2011 ). The copyright in the sound recording is governed by§ 114 of the Copy-
right Act and is limited to the actual reproduction of the recorded sounds. !d. § 114. 
255. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 9. 
256. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). 
257. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 9: I. 
258. See Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 610 (7th 
Cir. 1982). 
259. See supra Figure 6. 
260. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 8:1 ("One may think of a computer 
program as a combination of two works: a literary work consisting of the program's code, 
and an audiovisual work consisting of the pictures and sounds the program generates to the 
user."). 
261. !d. ("One infringes the copyright in a computer program when one copies pro-
tected elements of either the literary or the audiovisual component."). 
262. !d. § 8:4. A compilation is the "selection, coordination, and arrangement of 
information." !d. Hence, in regards to computer programs, "[t]he arrangement ofunprotecta-
ble code modules or commands may be protected as a compilation," for example. !d. 
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Second Circuit articulated the proper test for infringement of a computer 
program in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 263 courts 
have applied the abstraction-filtration-comparison test by abstracting a list 
of the elements the defendant copies, filtering out unprotectable elements, 
and comparing the elements that are left to determine if the programs are 
substantially similar. 264 
5. Factual Works: Distribution and Substantial Similarity Win Rate 
Opinions addressing facts involving nonfiction or factual works, 
which have the narrowest copyright protection of all subject categories, 
constituted 9.4% of the opinions studied. 265 Factual works, which include 
textbooks, educational materials, docudramas, television game shows, reali-
ty television, and other unscripted programs, 266 had a relatively high sub-
stantial similarity win rate of 39.1 %, where the plaintiff prevailed. 267 This 
result could be explained by the ease with which courts can discern the in-
fringement of a factual work. Indeed, "to support a finding of substantial 
similarity" between two factual works, "a higher quantity of copying is re-
quired,"268 which often "amount[ s] to verbatim reproduction or very close 
paraphrasing."269 Copyright protection is thus narrow, "embracing no more 
than the author's original expression of particular facts and theories already 
in the public domain."270 
263. 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992). 
264. See, e.g., Gen. Universal Sys., Inc. v. Lopez, 379 F.3d 131, 142-43 (5th Cir. 
2004); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543-44 (lith Cir. 1996); Eng'g Dynam-
ics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342-43 (5th Cir. 1994); Gates Rubber 
Co. v. Bando Chern. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823,834 (lOth Cir. 1993); see also Atari, Inc. v. N. 
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982) (conducting abstrac-
tion-filtration-comparison without naming it such); Cybermedia, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 19 
F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Control Data Sys., Inc. v. Infoware, Inc., 903 F. 
Supp. 1316, 1322 (D. Minn. 1995). 
265. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 6: ). To avoid inhibiting the use of 
factual materials, courts have emphasized that the copyright in nonfiction is "'narrow indeed, 
embracing no more than the author's original expression of particular facts and theories 
already in the public domain."' Jd. (quoting Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 
F.2d 972,974 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
266. Jd. 
267. See supra Figure 6. 
268. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65,71 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
269. Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th 
Cir. 1984); see also Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974. 
270. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974; accord Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. 
Supp. 1222, 1226 (C. D. Cal. 1997) (quoting Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 974). 
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6. Architectural Works: Distribution and Substantial Similarity Win 
Rate 
Finally, opinions involving architectural works comprised only 5.1% 
of the opinions. Like computer software cases, 271 disputes over architecture 
are a more recent phenomenon, with the first of such cases appearing in 
1984.272 This emergence is likely because, prior to the Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act of 1990, only the architectural plans for buildings, 
not the buildings themselves, could receive copyright protection. 273 Even 
now, although both architectural plans and constructions are protected, 
buildings constructed before December 1, 1990 are not protectable. 274 Ar-
chitectural works had a win rate of only 8.3%, the lowest in the sample,275 
likely due to the narrow range of protection such works are afforded. 
Copyright protection for architectural works "includes the overall 
form ... [and] the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in 
the [architectural] design, but does not include individual standard fea-
tures."276 Thus, an ordinary observer's overall impression of the works is the 
key inquiry for determining substantial similarity. 277 Still, courts evaluating 
architectural works admit to emphasizing dissimilarities more so than when 
analyzing other copyright claims, explaining that "there are only a fmite 
number of ways a rectangle can be divided into bedrooms, baths, kitchen, 
living room, closets and so on."278 Likewise, functional elements, such as 
the traffic flow route and methods of construction and engineering are un-
protectable. 279 Similarities that result from budgetary or regulatory con-
straints, adherence to particular style, conformity to existing buildings, and 
the inclusion of features that are common to urban high-rises are also not 
considered when evaluating substantial similarity, leaving a limited scope of 
271. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
272. Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
273. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 11 :3. 
274. !d. 
275. See supra Figure 6. 
276. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also Greenberg v. Town of Falmouth, No. Civ.A. 
04-11934-GAO, 2006 WL 297225, at *3 (D. Mass. Feb. 8, 2006) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(2006)). 
277. See Greenberg, 2006 WL 297225, at *4; Su, supra note 87, at 1853. 
278. Home Design Servs., Inc. v. David Weekley Homes, L.L.C., 548 F. Supp. 2d 
1306, 1313 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
279. OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 11 (quoting Attia V Soc'y of N.Y. 
Hosp., 201 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir 1999)). 
The Beginning of the End 553 
expression that depends largely on the effect created by certain design ele-
ments. 280 
E. Analysis of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Posture and Rates of Re-
versal and Affirmance 
The oft-stated rule is that "summary judgment is not highly favored on 
the substantial similarity issue in copyright cases"281 because an "extremely 
close issue of fact" 282 is usually involved. However, the data reveals some-
thing different: grants of summary judgment are the overwhelmingly fa-
vored means to jettison the issue of substantial similarity, "especially where 
defendants are [the] moving parties."283 Such a practice influences the result 
of the substantial similarity determination at the district level and on ap-
peal. zs4 
280. !d. § 11: 1 ("The 'effect' created by certain design elements can be a significant 
factor in the substantial similarity analysis with respect to architectural works, even if the 
designs themselves are distinguishable."). 
281. Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[A]s a general rule, 
summary judgment is not highly favored on the substantial similarity issue in copyright 
cases."). 
282. Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Substantial simi-
larity is usually an extremely close issue of fact and summary judgment has been disfavored 
in cases involving intellectual property."). 
283. Julie J. Bisceglia, Summary Judgment on Substantial Similarity in Copyright 
Actions, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 51, 75 (1993) ("On the contrary, summary judg-
ment is overwhelmingly favored on this issue, at least in the reported decisions, and especial-
ly where defendants are moving parties."). 
The large percentage of cases granting summary judgments to defendants reveals a 
distinct factual pattern: an unknown author sues a studio, a famous writer, or a fa-
mous star (or all three) for "copying" his work in a well-known movie, television 
show, or book claiming, "I wrote .... " The dismissal of these suits accounts not 
only for the vast majority of the summary judgment motions granted to defendants 
but also for the vast majority of summary judgment motions granted to any party 
on the issue of substantial similarity. 
!d. (footnote omitted). But see OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 3, § 3:1.1[0] (noting 
that courts should be wary of granting summary judgment in copyright cases because of their 
highly fact specific nature); Dalton & Cable, supra note 48, at 26 ('"In copyright infringe-
ment cases, granting summary judgment, particularly in favor of a defendant, is a practice to 
be used sparingly .... "' (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2003))). 
"Summary judgment on substantial similarity is 'unusual"' in that '"[s]ubstantial similarity is 
customarily an extremely close question of fact ... ' and thus 'summary judgment has tradi-
tionally been frowned upon in copyright litigation."' !d. (quoting T-Peg, Inc. v. Vt. Timber 
Works, Inc., 459 F.3d 97, 112 (1st Cir. 2006); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 
F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980)). The general rule is that plagiarism suits, given the '"fact-based 
nature of the substantial similarity 'inquiry,"' should proceed to trial. !d. (quoting Alexrod 
& Cherveny Architects, P.C. v. Winmar Homes, No. 2:05-cv-711, 2007 WL 708798, at *8 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2007)). 
284. See, e.g., supra notes 268-70,281-82. 
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1. Distribution of Substantial Similarity Opinions by Posture on Ap-
peal 
Figure 7 shows the procedural postures-across time--of district 
court opinions on appeal to the circuit courts. A moving average of the most 
frequent postures-bench trial verdict, grant of summary judgment, and 
issuance of a preliminary injunction--of the appealed district court opinions 
from 1970 to 2010 reveals an increasing trend in the number of substantial 
similarity cases decided on a motion for summary judgment. In fact, in the 
total sample of 234 opinions, ranging from 1923 to 2010, 128 opinions had 
resolved the issue of substantial similarity by summary judgment at the dis-
trict court level. 
Figure 7: Three-Period Moving Averages of the Dispositions District Court 
Opinions Appealed to the Circuit Courts 
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Figure 7 also depicts a steep increase in the number of summary 
judgment opinions in the mid-1980s, which coincides with a decrease in 
number of bench trials. 285 The mid-1980s bump could likely be the result of 
several prominent appellate court opinions, each of which affirmed the low-
er court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant: Litchfield v. 
Spie/berg/86 referenced in 254 other cases; 287 Berkic v. Crichton, 288 refer-
285. See also Beebe, supra note 10, at 571-72 & fig.3 (finding a substantial drop-off 
in the proportion per year of bench trial opinions in 1994 and a fairly dramatic increase, 
beginning in the early to mid-1990s, in the proportion of opinions which engaged in sum-
mary adjudication of the fair use defense). 
286. 736 F.2d at 1354. 
287. These numbers were found using Westlaw on April23, 2013./d. 
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enced in 105 other cases;289 and Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 290 refer-
enced in 376 other cases. 291 Indeed, in these opinions and those that follow 
them, the courts recognize that "granting summary judgment, particularly in 
favor of a defendant, is a practice to be used sparingly in copyright in-
fringement cases,"292 but nevertheless state that "a court may compare the 
two works and render a judgment for the defendant on the ground that as a 
matter of law a trier of fact would not be permitted to find substantial simi-
larity."293 Indeed, another survey of sixty cases published over the past four 
years reveals that pretrial dismissals of copyright claims on the basis of sub-
stantial similarity are hardly a long shot. 294 
2. Substantial Similarity Win Rates by Posture on Appeal 
Table 2 displays the distribution of opinions according to the holding 
of the district court and the fate of those decisions on appeal to the circuit 
courts. At the district level, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-finding 
substantial similarity-in 23.9% of the 234 cases, while ruling for the de-
fendant-finding no substantial similarity-in 76.1% of cases. Of the 56 
cases where the lower court favored the plaintiff, finding substantial similar-
ity, the court of appeals also ruled for the plaintiff in 73.2% of the cases; 
but, in 26.8% of the cases, the circuit court disagreed with the lower court's 
finding of substantial similarity, ruling instead for the defendant. Converse-
ly, of the 17 8 cases where the lower court favored the defendant, not finding 
substantial similarity, the court of appeals also ruled for the defendant in 
80.3% of the cases while the court of appeals ruled for the plaintiff follow-
ing a defendant-favorable holding at the district court level in only 19.7% of 
cases. Taken together, this data indicates defendants are much more likely 
than plaintiffs to win at the district level, and defendant-favorable holdings 
are also more likely than plaintiff-favorable holdings to be upheld on ap-
peal. 
288. 761 F.2d 1289,1290-91 (9thCir. 1985). 
289. These numbers were found using Westlaw on April23, 2013. !d. 
290. 784 F.2d 44,46 (2d Cir. 1986). 
291. These numbers were found using Westlaw on April 23, 2013. /d. 
292. Wickham v. Knoxville Tnt'! Energy Exposition, Inc., 739 F.2d 1094, 1097 (6th 
Cir. 1984); see also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 4 70-73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
293. Wickham, 739 F.2d at 1097; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 
F.2d 905,918 (2d Cir.1980). 
294. Dalton & Cable, supra note 48, at 26 ("With such dire indications, pretrial dis-
missal of a copyright claim on the basis of substantial similarity might seem a long shot. Yet, 
a survey of over 60 published federal cases from the past four years reveals this is not true."). 
"This article distills insights from those cases to chart a relatively straightforward, practical 
approach that a copyright defendant in any circuit can take to increase the chance of defeat-
ing substantial similarity on summary judgment." /d. 
556 Michigan State Law Review 2013:513 
Table 2A: Distribution of Opinions by Posture on Appeal 
POSTIJREON APP~ APPELLATERUUNG 
Found Substantial Similarity NoSS FoundSS 
(Plaintiff Win) n % (Rewrsed) (Affirmed) 
Bench Trial 20 8.5% 20.0% 80.00/o 
Jury Trial 11 4.7% 18.2% 81.8% 
Summary Judgment 8 3.4% 62.5% 37.5% 
Prelimina!X In~nction 17 7.3% 23.5% 76.5% 
Total-Plaintiff 56 23.90/o 26.8% 73.:20/o 
Table 2B: Distribution of Opinions by Posture on Appeal 
POSTIJREON APPFAL 














No SS FoundSS 
% (Reversed) (Affirmed) 
8.5% 20.0% 80.0% 
4.7%) 18.2% 81.8% 
3.4% 62.5% 37.5% 
7.3% 23.5% 76.5% 
23.()0/o 26.8% 73.2% 
Though the reason for this imbalance is unknown, it could be ex-
plained by the posture of the cases on appeal. For instance, before reaching 
the court of appeals, 55.3%295 of the plaintiff-favorable district court deci-
sions were adjudicated via bench trial or jury trial while only 14.0%296 of the 
defendant-favorable district court decisions were adjudicated via bench or 
jury trial. Moreover, of the entire sample of 234 opinions, only 3.4% of the 
plaintiff-favorable district court decisions were resolved at the summary 
judgment stage; yet, district courts granted a defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment in 51.3% of the cases. Simply put, on the issue of substantial 
similarity at the district level, more than half of plaintiff-favorable decisions 
295. The number of plaintiff-favorable bench trial opinions (n = 20) and jury trial 
opinions (n = II) were added together and then divided by the total number of plaintiff-
favorable district court opinions (n = 56). 
296. The number of defendant-favorable bench trial opinions (n = 22) and jury trial 
opinions (n = 3) were added together and then divided by the total number of defendant-
favorable district court opinions (n = 178). 
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are decided by trial and just over half of defendant-favorable decisions are 
made at the summary judgment stage. 
An environment where summary judgment is frequently granted in fa-
vor of defendants on the substantial similarity issue poses a significant chal-
lenge to plaintiffs. 297 As shown by Figure 9, periods of declining substantial 
similarity win rates are roughly met with respective increases in the per-
centage of summary judgment opinions over time. Thus, an increase in 
summary adjudications coincides with a decline in the frequency of trials, 
but it also corresponds to a decrease in substantial similarity win rates. This 
result raises the possibility that summary judgment on the substantial simi-
larity issue may actually decrease the likelihood that a copyright holder will 
prevail due to the fact that the proper test for substantial similarity-which 
"requires the response of the ordinary lay observer," not the judge-is not 
applied. 298 The substantial similarity issue, it would seem, is an "archetypal 
jury question, for which summary judgment would never be appropriate."299 
Consequently, one could deduce that a defendant-favorable district 
court decision finding that the works are not substantially similar is less 
likely to be overturned on appeal because, in most cases, that decision was 
made at the summary judgment stage; 300 and, presumably, the case is weak 
or frivolous. 301 
297. See Bisceglia, supra note 283, at 75; see also Morton Denlow, Summary Judg-
ment: Boon or Burden?, JUDGES' J., Summer 1998, at 26-27 ("Although a plaintiff has equal 
recourse to summary judgment under Rule 56, the motion has largely become a defendant's 
weapon.") 
298. Bisceglia, supra note 283, at 55-56 (arguing that "[s]ummary judgment based on 
the issue of substantial similarity creates tension between legal theory and practice," and that 
the high percentage of successful defendant motions for summary judgment may reflect the 
inadequacy of the existing substantial similarity tests). 
299. /d. at 55. 
300. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads: 
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or 
the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The 
court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or denying the 
motion. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 56( a). See generally Maxwell H. Herriott, Summary Judgment Practice, in 5 
AM. JUR. TRIALS I 05 ( 1966). 
301. See Bisceglia, supra note 283, at 64, 75 (finding that "[o]f the cases reviewed, 
victories for moving defendants constitute more than all other victories combined"). 
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Much ink has been spilled on the accuracy and implications of rever-
sal and affirmance rates in circuit courts. 302 Curiously, however, no compre-
hensive research concerning the circuit courts' reversals and affirmances of 
copyright decisions involving the issue of substantial similarity could be 
found. Although recent estimates of overall circuit court reversals and af-
firmances were available, estimates from different sources widely varied. 303 
For instance, one study estimates an overall circuit courts reversal rate of 
302. See, e.g., Joseph L. Smith, Patterns and Consequences of Judicial Reversals: 
Theoretical Considerations and Data from a District Court, 27 JusT. SYs. J. 28, 30-31 
(2006); Paul M. Schoenhard, Reversing the Reversal Rate: Using Real Property Principles to 
Guide Federal Circuit Patent Jurisprudence, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
299, 302 (2007); Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer-Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE 
L.J. 218, 219-29 (1961); Frank B. Cross, Comparative Judicial Databases, 83 JUDICATURE 
248, 248-49 (2000). 
303. The U.S. courts of appeals overturned more than 26o/o of judgments in civil 
matters. Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep: An Empirical Study of the 
Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1158-59 
(20 1 0); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication 
and the Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 135 n.42 (2005). Oldfather cites the 1960 Annual 
Report by the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, which found a 24.5o/o 
reversal rate in the federal courts of appeals among cases terminated on the merits. !d. (citing 
ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 210 tbl.Bl 
(1960)). By contrast, the same office reported a 9.4% reversal rate in 2003. /d. (citing OFFICE 
OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD 
STATISTICS 27 tbl.B-5 (2003), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2003/tables/BO 
5Mar03 .pdf). 
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32% from 1980 to 2002. 304 Still, another article remarks that, according to 
the Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, the proportion of appeals that the circuit courts have reversed has 
declined precipitously over the years, from 24.5% in 1960 to 9.4% in 
2003. 305 This decline corroborates with 2010 data, which indicates a reversal 
rate of 8.4% across all circuits. 306 Comparatively, of the 234 majority circuit 
courts opinions in this study, 47 reversed, remanded, and/or vacated the 
district court holding, for an overall reversal rate of 25.1 %. Of the reversals, 
31.9% of the circuit courts opinions reversed a district court finding of sub-
stantial similarity, holding instead for the defendant while 68.1% of the re-
versals resulted in a finding of substantial similarity. In contrast, the circuit 
courts affirmed 187 district court decisions, for an affirmance rate of 77 .0%. 
Of the affirmances, 76.5% upheld a defendant-favorable decision, finding 
that the contested works were not substantially similar, whereas 23.5% of 
the affirmances upheld a plaintiff-favorable decision. Accordingly, reversals 
more often favor the copyright holder, while most affirmances favor the 
alleged copier. The reversal rate evidenced by this study supports the notion 
that appellate courts often affirm lower court holdings, and the results are 
not significantly different from a similar study of fair use opinions, which 
found a reversal rate of 33.8%. 307 
According to some scholars, reversal rates are implicit measurements 
of the quality of lower court performances. 308 In this way, reversal rates are 
used to justify the negative inference that the district court was wrong. 309 
Indeed, studies of judicial behavior reveal that judges dislike having their 
decisions reversed and may avoid it in an effort to advance his or her ca-
304. Beebe, supra note 10, at 574 (citing Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial 
Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & Soc'y 
REV. 163, 177 tbl.l (2006)). 
305. Oldfather, supra note 303, at 135 n.42. 1960 is generally regarded as the year in 
which the dramatic changes in the business of the lower federal courts began. See Martha 1. 
Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. 
L. REV. II, 25 n.72 (1996). 
306. OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL 
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 13-16 (20 I 0), available at 
http://www. uscourts. gov/uscourts/S tatistics/Statistica!Tab lesF orTheF ederalJudiciary/20 I 0/de 
c I 0/805Dec I O.pdf (indicating the following reversal rates statistics in each circuit for 20 I 0: 
D.C. Circuit, 16.5%; First Circuit, 8.8%; Second Circuit, 6.6%; Third Circuit, 8.4%; Fourth 
Circuit, 5.6%; Fifth Circuit, 7.8%; Sixth Circuit, 10.0%; Seventh Circuit, 17.1 %; Eighth 
Circuit, 4.7%; Ninth Circuit, 9.6%; Tenth Circuit, 5.7%; and Eleventh Circuit, 8.2%). 
307. See Beebe, supra note 10, at 574. 
308. Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Gener-
alist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals, J.L. & 
EcoN. (forthcoming) (George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 
09-07, 2009) (manuscript at 14-15), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1319888##. 
309. !d. at I 0. 
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reer. 310 Unfortunately, evidence indicating that judges adjust their opinion-
writing practices to minimize their workload and maximize their affirmance 
rate 311 can be highly problematic, especially where the issue is complicated 
or unfamiliar. Of the opinions studied, the combined average reversal rate 
for the Second and Ninth Circuits is 17 .5%, while the average reversal rate 
for all other circuits combined is 23.5%. Notably, the Second and Ninth 
Circuit reversal rates-14.9% and 22.6% respectively-were amongst the 
lowest in the sample, conceivably due to familiarity with the substantial 
310. Smith, supra note 302, at 30-31. 
Students of judicial behavior commonly argue that judges do not like to have their 
decisions reversed. This assumption can have several bases. First, being overturned 
implies that a judge, or panel of judges at a higher level, has determined that the 
lower-court judge applied the law incorrectly. [A] judge "might prefer to avoid re-
versal in order to evade conscious awareness of the real constraints on her power." 
"Judges, no more than other men, enjoy the prospect of public correction and rep-
rimand" ... [and] are "highly sensitive to being reversed." Nonetheless, some 
judges in some contexts may wear reversals as badges of honor. Interviews with 
federal judges support the notion that judges dislike having their decisions re-
versed. An anonymous district judge from the District of Columbia expressed his 
distaste for having decisions reversed: '"Nobody likes it. I don't like it at all. But 
you have to call them as you see them, and sometimes they [the circuit-court judg-
es] just don't see them in the same way .... When the Supreme Court reverses the 
appeals court and rules in your favor,' the judge says, '"that's the real happy situa-
tion.'" 
/d. (citations omitted). 
311. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District 
Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals 24 (Univ. of Chi. John 
M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 508, 2010; N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 10-06, 2010), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/508-eap-dist-judge.pdf. 
Reversals can influence judges in a couple of ways. A version to being reversed can 
motivate lower-court judges to conform their decisions to doctrines articulated by 
higher courts. In this way, it is the predicted cost of reversal, or the anticipated 
negative utility of having a decision reversed multiplied by the probability that tile 
decision will be reversed, that motivates lower-court judges. For district-court 
judges, evaluating the probability of reversal is complicated. This uncertainty 
comes from several factors. First, a district judge does not know whether the losing 
party will appeal the decision to a higher court. If they do not, the chance of rever-
sal is zero. A second factor is that the law is simply ambiguous or novel in many 
cases. The fact that both the plaintiff and defendant are willing to invest money to 
litigate a legal issue suggests that each side believes it has a substantial chance of 
winning. Since cases reaching trial are "close calls," it is difficult for a district 
judge to predict how the circuit court will view the issue. Finally, if the decision is 
appealed, the district judge cannot know which judges on the circuit court will hear 
the case. Once the appeal is filed, it will be assigned to a randomly selected three-
judge panel. The fact that predicting which decisions are likely to be reversed is so 
complicated makes a strategy of prospectively avoiding reversal unlikely to suc-
ceed. 
Smith, supra note 302, at 31 (citation omitted). 
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similarity doctrine. To at least a limited extent, this finding supports the 
notion that when "generalist judges are confronted with the specialty subject 
matter infrequently, they lack the motivation, experience, and time to devel-
op an understanding of the law."3 ' 2 There is a compelling argument that 
"copyright is a highly specialized and technical body of law ... that would 
be best handled by specialized judges,'@ who might be better able to medi-
ate the "frustrating and contradictory results at the district court level."314 
Even so, "[t]here is no evidence that appellate panels are [any] more likely 
than federal district court judges to possess" the expertise necessary to write 
a theoretically correct opinion discussing substantial similarity. 315 Consider-
ing the subtle differences in how the circuits compare works in copyright 
infringement cases and the apparent cloudiness of the correct procedure for 
making the substantial similarity determination,316 reversal rates may actual-
ly have less to do with quality, and more to do with "maintaining uniformity 
in judicial decisions."317 Frequent reversals may also "reflect a period of 
378. 
!d. 
312. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 
Most important, the court's expertise should enable it to craft better opinions, espe-
cially in fields where a small number of cases are now distributed rather thinly 
among the regional courts. Since generalist judges are confronted with the special-
ty subject matter infrequently, they lack the motivation, experience, and time to 
develop an understanding of the law. They decide the occasional case based upon a 
cursory understanding of policy and receive limited feedback on how well they 
fared. Thus, [a] specialized court's sustained involvement with a field would facili-
tate superior decisionmaking. 
313. Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright 
Court: Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 719 
(1999). 
314. !d. at 719, 738-39 (arguing that "the national nature of the copyright industries 
and the highly technical legal doctrines ... support the notion that copyright cases should be 
handled by a single court of nationwide jurisdiction, and that more of the decisions on the 
issues should be made by judges rather than juries"). "These measures are necessary in order 
that uniformity in the handling of copyright cases can be achieved." !d. at 719. 
315. See Baye & Wright, supra note 308, at 14. "Along with efficiency in deci-
sionmaking, the other probable benefits of specialized courts are uniformity in the law and 
expertise in decisionmaking." Ford, supra note 92, at 49. "The test of this hypothesis is to 
compare each circuit's relative experience with copyright litigation to its representation in 
copyright and intellectual property casebooks, on the assumption that casebook editors gen-
erally prefer better decisions." !d. at 5. "With a few exceptions, federal judges are generalists 
who have jurisdiction over an enormous range of legal disputes ... . "!d. at 3. But see id. at 
41 ("Only two circuits, the Second and the Ninth, plausibly possess sufficient experience 
with copyright litigation to acquire substantially greater expertise relative to the other cir-
cuits."). 
316. See supra Section II .B. 
317. Smith, supra note 302, at 30. 
A reversal is the most definitive and forceful mechanism for communication of le-
gal policy possessed by a higher court. It is also the only commonly used tool pos-
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uncertainty in the law that may decrease over time or a disagreement be-
tween district court and appellate judges on the substantive merits."318 Addi-
tionally, factors such as circuit size, docket composition, and circuit ideolo-
gy have been shown to impact reversal rates. 319 
CONCLUSION 
The door has been swung open. By providing the results of the first 
empirical analysis of substantial similarity litigation in the U.S. circuit 
courts, this study has contributed the initial groundwork for a future body of 
research examining the dynamics of the substantial similarity tests. It has 
answered questions that deepen an understanding of the substantial similari-
ty doctrine, and it has shed light on the doctrine's impact on creators' rights. 
Yet, just as research is undertaken to answer questions, its discoveries inevi-
tably raise many others. With the ultimate goal of proposing a framework, 
rooted in concrete empirical evidence, for how copyright infringement 
ought to be decided, further exploration of the following questions is cru-
cial. 
What is the extent of the linkage between the fair use and substantial 
similarity doctrines? This study has suggested that Campbell's ruling in 
favor of the defendant parodist may have tipped the scale in favor of alleged 
infringers, influencing a subsequent trend of defendant-favorable substantial 
similarity case law. 32° Campbell readjusted the weight to be accorded to 
each of the four factors of the fair use test, creating concern that the out-
sessed by higher courts that imposes any costs on lower-court judges. Because of 
these attributes, reversals are likely to play an important role in maintaining uni-
formity in judicial decisions .... [J]udicial opinions are the most straightforward 
way for this hierarchical communication to occur. Opinions can list and explain the 
criteria that higher courts want lower courts to apply in deciding cases; are availa-
ble for all lower-court judges to see; and apply to all lower courts supervised by the 
higher court that issues the opinions. However, while the opinions apply equally to 
all such lower-court judges, judges not directly affected by an opinion are not like-
ly to feel the impact of the opinion as much as the judge whose decision was af-
firmed or overturned by the circuit court. 
/d.; see also Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 
1385 (2009); FRANK 8. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2 
(2007) ("[T]he circuit courts are much more important [than the U.S. Supreme Court] in 
setting and enforcing the Jaw of the United States."); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2002) ("The truth, well known but often overlooked 
in the media and even in serious scholarship, is that lower court judges play a major role in 
the development of legal doctrine."). 
318. Baye & Wright, supra note 308, at 14-15. 
319. Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and 
Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L. REv. 659, 
690-91 (2007). 
320. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
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come of a fair use case inextricably hinges upon the outcome of the first 
factor. 321 Thus, if the fair use test is only marginally influenced by the third 
factor, which considers whether the two works are substantially similar,322 it 
is possible that substantial similarity case law may have been affected by 
Campbell's holding and may continue to be influenced by fair use case law. 
Should the variations of the substantial similarity tests be abolished in 
favor of one universal test? This study has found that if the opinions are 
distributed into three groups based on the substantial similarity test applied 
by the court-( 1) the ordinary observer test and more discerning ordinary 
observer test; (2) the extrinsic/intrinsic test and extrinsic/intrinsic test with 
intended audience test; and (3) the abstraction-filtration-comparison test and 
abstraction-filtration by the intended audience test-the likelihood that the 
copyright holder will prevail remains relatively unchanged, regardless of 
which test is used. 323 Despite the confusion engendered by the tests and the 
criticism launched against them, this study suggests that their differences 
are inconsequential. 324 No test is superior. 325 
Would the substantial similarity win rates of the specialized versions 
of the substantial similarity tests326 differ if the sample size was larger? 
These specialized tests evidenced high variation from their non-specialized 
counterparts. 327 For example, opinions applying the more discerning ordi-
nary observer test had a 55.6% substantial similarity win rate; opinions ap-
plying the extrinsic/intrinsic test with the intended audience test had a 
25.0% substantial similarity win rate; and opinions applying the abstraction-
filtration by the intended audience test had a 42.9% substantial similarity 
win rate. 328 However, these opinions comprised only a small portion of the 
234 cases in the sample;329 therefore, further study of these tests must be 
pursued. 
What explains the high degree of variation between the substantial 
similarity win rates across different subject matters? In disputes involving 
architectural works, the copyright holder prevailed in only 8.3% of the opin-
ions,330 while the copyright holder prevailed in 53.6% of disputes involving 
321. Beebe, supra note 10, at 553, 583. 
322. See, e.g., id. at 553, 615-16. For instance, if a court finds that the defendant's 
work is "transformative" or "noncommercial" under the first factor, then the court will also 
likely find that the remaining three factors favor the defendant. !d. at 583. 
323. See supra Subsection JII.C.2. 
324. See supra Subsection JII.C.2. 
325. See supra Subsection III.C.2. 
326. "Specialized versions of the substantial similarity tests" refers to the more dis-
cerning ordinary observer test, the extrinsic/intrinsic test with the intended audience test, and 
the abstraction-filtration by the intended audience test. 
327. See supra Subsection III.C.2. 
328. See supra Subsection ITI.C.2, figs.4 & 5, and notes 228-29. 
329. See supra note 228. 
330. See supra Subsection III.D.6. 
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graphic works. 331 This study posited that the variation may be attributable to 
the extent to which each type of subject matter is comprised of functional 
elements. 332 For example, the low substantial similarity win rate of opinions 
involving architectural works may be explained by the many functional 
elements inherent in architecture, such as the unprotectable placement of a 
bathroom near a bedroom and the unprotectable inclusion of common de-
sign features. 333 At the opposite end of the spectrum, the broad category of 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works requires the court to take an ap-
proach that is tailored to the specific type of work because the expression of 
a stuffed animal, for instance, is much different from the expression of a 
painting. 334 Even within each specific graphic work, the differences in ex-
pression can seem infinite. Certainly, one can imagine virtually limitless 
ways to paint a landscape. This suggests that a copyright holder's likelihood 
of prevailing may depend on the extent to which the subject matter is inher-
ently comprised of functional elements, scenes a faire, and finite opportuni-
ties for creative expression. Consequently, the variance in win rates 
amongst the circuits may be a product of the subject matters most often ad-
dressed within each circuit. 
How would the outcomes of substantial similarity cases differ if the 
disputes terminated on summary judgment had instead proceeded to trial? 
Evidence that summary adjudications coincide with fewer decisions favora-
ble to the copyright holder suggests that when a dispute is decided on sum-
mary judgment, the proper test for infringement is not appropriately or en-
tirely applied. 335 Further, this study revealed that district court grants of 
summary judgment are frequently affirmed-more so than any other dispo-
sition-which raises the possibility that the circuit courts may not be con-
ducting complete de novo reviews. 336 Further exploration of these findings is 
warranted. 
What explains the consistently low overall substantial similarity win 
rate for the copyright holder? If inequitable decision-making is at the crux 
of the low overall substantial similarity win rates, the frequency of summary 
adjudications, and the variance of win rates among the circuits and among 
the various subject matters then what is the solution? 
As an understanding of the substantial similarity doctrine evolves and 
as the variables that contribute to a finding of copyright infringement are 
exposed and substantiated, it may become apparent that the options for im-
proving the current framework are scarcely limited. The adoption of special-
331. See supra Subsection III.D.2. 
332. See supra Subsection III.D.6. 
333. See supra Subsection III.D.6. 
334. See supra Subsection III.D.2. 
335. See supra Subsection III.E.2. 
336. See supra Subsection III.E.2. 
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ized intellectual property courts would be one way to counteract the possi-
bility of systematic failures within the substantial similarity doctrine. 337 In-
deed, if bankruptcy courts were established in response to the critical and 
rapid changes in the commercial landscape of the U.S. economy,338 it stands 
to reason that intellectual property-vital to the U.S. economy and constant-
ly evolving in ways no one could have anticipated-may also require spe-
cialized courts. 339 There can be no doubt that the modem world depends on 
creativity and innovation-the hallmarks of copyright and intellectual prop-
erty-and, as such, it is axiomatic that society must continually rethink and 
revise the fundamental frameworks upon which it operates. With intellectu-
al capital contributing between $8.1 trillion and $9.2 trillion, the equivalent 
of 55% to 62.5% of the U.S. gross domestic product, 340 the judicial system, 
generally, and the substantial similarity doctrine, specifically, cannot afford 
to be an exception to such revision. The substantial similarity doctrine is 
one that demands reevaluation; a consistent test with equitable outcomes is 
necessary to protect the integrity and growth of intellectual capital in the 
U.S. economy. 
337. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text. 
338. See Douglas G. Smith, The Role of the Courts in Shaping American Bankruptcy 
Law: Review of "Debt's Dominion-A History of Bankruptcy Law in America," 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. I 09, Ill, 125-26 (2003). 
339. See supra notes 313-15 and accompanying text. 
340. See supra Section LA. 

